China’s stock markets have been on a tear over the last few months, with the benchmark CSI 300 Index – which tracks the biggest companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen – up 25% since its low point in February.
Beijing has wanted the market to rally for quite some time – but this upsurge has come as something of a surprise.
China’s economic fundamentals aren’t really conducive to a market recovery: deflation isn’t getting any better, consumer confidence is still weak, the property sector has been worsening, and local governments still aren’t paying their suppliers.
But Beijing is hoping that there’s a real foundation to this rally – a foundation that it’s responsible for building, quietly and gradually, over the past 18 months.
In our latest podcast, Trivium Co-founder Andrew Polk and Dinny McMahon, Head of Markets Research, discuss the recent market rally, as well as the changing role Beijing envisions for the stock market in the economy.
They also explore Beijing’s:
Concept of a “slow bull market”
And efforts to rebuild public trust in the market, to make it a worthwhile place to invest
Transcript Follows:
Andrew Polk:
Hi, everybody, and welcome to the latest edition of the Trivium China Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I’m your host, Trivium Cofounder – Andrew Polk. And I’m joined today, once again, by Trivium’s Head of Markets Research, Dinny McMahon. Dinny, welcome. How are you doing, man?
Dinny McMahon:
I’m doing good, Andrew. Good to see you, mate.
Andrew:
Yeah. Great to have you here. We are going to talk today about China’s stock market and the big run it’s been on over the past several months, actually. And there’s an ongoing conversation about this, how sustainable is the rally. And, sort of, also there’s a conversation about how there’s a rally happening, but the economy is not doing particularly well. So, is that tension going to bring down the stock market at some point? So, the real question is what’s going on in the stock market? Why is the rally happening? How sustainable is it? And how can it be taking place in the face of not exceptional economic data? So that’s what we’re going to go through today. Going to be a little bit of a shorter pod.
I’m traveling, coming to you all from London today. It’s about 7:45 PM on Friday, August 29th, here where I am, Dinny’s in Chicago, just to timestamp this so everybody knows what’s going on. But we’ll get into it here in a sec. We got to start, of course, though with the customary vibe check. Dinny, how are you doing, man? How’s your vibe?
Dinny:
It’s a long weekend starting tonight, mate. So, all is good with the world.
Andrew:
Nice. That’s a very good vibe.
Dinny:
It’s Labor Day on Monday in the United States.
Andrew:
Yeah. Let’s keep it short so we can start the weekend. I, unfortunately, will be working on Monday. My vibe is jet-lagged. Man, my colleagues are sick of me complaining about it, but the like 6 or 7 hours to the east always screws me up. Makes me stay up late, and it’s hard to get up in the mornings, but I think we won’t let that slow us down. That’s part of the reason why we’re recording so late here. And, hopefully, we can get these good vibes going into this long weekend for those of you in the U.S. But before we do the full dig into the content, of course, last item up top is the housekeeping.
A quick reminder, as always, we’re not just a podcast here. Trivium China is a strategic advisory firm that helps businesses and investors navigate the China policy landscape. That, of course, includes policy in China around various policy areas or industry. So, it could be technology, it could be EVs, it could be renewable energy. Anything where the government is taking policy initiative, we cover it. And it also includes policy towards China out of Western capitals like D.C., London, Brussels and others.
So, if you need help on any of that stuff, please reach out to us, hq@triviumchin.com is the email. We’d love to have a conversation about how we can support your business or your fund. Otherwise, if you’re interested in receiving more Trivium content, generally check out our website, triviumchina.com. We’ve got a bunch of different subscription products as well, both free and paid. You can definitely find China policy intel you need on our site, whatever your specific interest is when it comes to China. And then, finally, really, I mean it this time, guys, tell your friends and colleagues about Trivium. It really does help us a ton. It helps us to grow the listenership for the pod. It helps us to grow our business, which allows us to create more free content for those of you who are here for the free content. So easy ask, just so next time somebody says, “Hey, what podcast are you listening to?” Tell them, “Trivium China Podcast. Even if you’re not interested in China, those guys are informative and hilarious and good-looking, so you’ll want to take a listen.”
It’s okay to lie a little bit, just get them to download the pod, and then they’ll be hooked, I’m sure. All right, enough of that. Let’s get into it, Dinny. We’re talking about the stock market today. Just a little context here. After having been one of the worst-performing stock markets globally for the last few years, valuations, stock valuations are finally rising in China. The CSI 300, which is kind of the main stock index in China, and it tracks the biggest stocks in the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges, is up 25% from the low point in April and at its highest level in more than three years.
So, really on a pretty solid run for the past several months. But it’s not exactly clear what’s going on here, why the rally is happening. China’s economic fundamentals, as I said, aren’t really conducive to a stock market rally. Deflation isn’t getting any better. Consumer confidence remains really weak. The property sector has been going from bad to worse. Local government still aren’t paying their suppliers.
So, there’s local fiscal austerity. So, there could be a case to be made that this movement in stocks is sort of incipient enthusiasm for the crackdown in overcapacity that Beijing had signaled. So, that’s the anti-involution stuff that we’ve talked about in several podcasts. The reason, then, that that might push up stock prices is because if prices for those goods, upstream goods, industrial goods go up, the profitability of firms increases. Thereby, obviously, their share prices should increase. But even then, it’s not really clear what Beijing intends to do on this anti-involution push. So, it does seem a bit tenuous to sort of chalk it all up to investors being excited about capacity reductions or overall policy movement on the involution side.
So, not clear what’s going on totally. But what is clear is that the rally hasn’t been engineered by Beijing this time. In fact, Beijing tried to do that in the second half of 2023. So, about 18 months ago, it rolled out the usual tricks by like increasing margin borrowing limits. That’s the amount that investors can basically borrow to invest in the stock market, banning short selling, imposing a moratorium on new IPOs, which often suck liquidity out of the market, and pushing state-owned firms to buy stocks, but just didn’t work. Market yawned, sort of popped a little bit, then just rolled over and moved sideways. But, while Beijing hasn’t really engineered this, we do think that authorities are hoping that they were sort of instrumental laying the foundations for this rally and that this rally won’t be a flash in the pan, but the start of something more long-term and more durable.
They’ve been saying for a long time they want what they call a slow bull market, which we’ll get into, which is just steadily rising values over time, over five years, ten years, much like you have in sort of Western stock markets, particularly the U.S. stock market. But whether that happens, only time will tell. Only 18 months ago, Beijing radically changed its approach to regulating the stock market. And it’s not unrealistic to think that those changes might be starting to finally have an impact in helping to push this rally along. So, I’ve kind of thrown a lot out there. Dinny, give us a little bit more big context. 18 months ago, what happened that Beijing changed its approach to the stock market? This would be sort of February 2024. What happened at that point, and what’s significant in terms of what might be seeing today from those changes?
Dinny:
Well, the real significance of February 2024 is that the securities regulator was replaced. So, the previous guy, who was chairman of the CSC, that was Yi Huiman, and he was responsible for pursuing that government-led attempt to inflate the market that you were talking about just a minute ago. And then in February 2024, he was replaced by Wu Qing, who’s the current chairman, who took a completely different approach to regulating the market. Now, of course, that sounds like Wu came in with his own ideas. But, of course, that’s not how China works. I mean, you put somebody in a new bureaucratic role, you know, and sort of sit back and watch what this guy can do and like what new ideas he brings. I mean, he’s ultimately a cog in the machine.
And, certainly, if you know where to look, the changes that Wu Qing ended up pursuing had kind of been outlined in some depth in the state media sort of months before, even at a time that Beijing was trying to inflate high valuations in the market with its old tricks. But when Wu came in, that was a bit of a pivot point. The change was quite sudden and undeniable.
Andrew:
So, what exactly was it that Wu did when he came in?
Dinny:
Before we can kind of get into the specifics of the macro of sort of the policy changes, you kind of have to understand that, over the last few years, there’s been a real change in Beijing, a quite a radical change, actually, in terms of how they think about the role of the stock market in the economy. So, traditionally, the stock market has been an absolute sideshow. I mean, it’s not relevant to the economy at all. I mean, traditionally, any company that could raise money in the stock market could do it just as easily from the banks as well. When the economy was doing well, it didn’t necessarily mean that the stock market was doing well. There wasn’t any real link there. And there wasn’t a link the other way as well.
So, in the United States, when the stock market’s doing well, well, you know, so goes the economy. But that never existed in China. Stock market was kind of out there on its own, doing its own thing, really didn’t matter one way or the other to the greater economic picture. But China’s authorities, I know this is coming from the top, I mean, Xi Jinping wants that to change for some really three very fundamental reasons. First is because of Xi’s vision of what he wants the economy to look like. And that is an economy that is driven by innovation and technological upgrading. But that has a very specific role for the financial sector. The general consensus is that the banks just adapt to it. Because China’s banks have been described before, and I think I’ve used this expression myself before on the podcast, are ultimately glorified pawnshops.
They’re low-risk institutions that make loans based on the collateral that they can be given, the security that they can hold against those loans. So, it’s a very low-risk operation, very much based on everything being backed by some sort of collateral. That the sort of economy that Xi wants is one in which you have small firms pursuing high-risk, innovative technologies. It’s one in which bigger firms are in a position to buy up failing firms, or bigger firms are in a position to buy out small, innovative firms that have the technology that they need. And so it’s really a financial system that needs angel investors and it needs VC, and it needs private lending and mezzanine capital, and it needs M&A loans.
What it ultimately needs is a system where investors or financial institutions with different risk profiles or different risk tolerances all exist side by side to be able to support the various different companies that are sort of operating parallel to kind of realize Xi Jinping’s vision of a more technologically advanced economy. And you can’t do that with a banking system. But you can do it with a vibrant capital market and do it with a vibrant stock market. So, that’s the first thing. In Xi’s estimation, all of a sudden, the stock market has become incredibly important because, to realize his vision of the economic transformation, it needs to be functioning in a way that it works, really, say, in the United States.
The second issue is that the housing market is dead. Really, this is what it comes down to. And the housing market was the engine of middle-class wealth creation in China for 20 years. And it’s dead and it’s never coming back. And so, for the sake of building the middle class, for the sake of bolstering consumption, for the sake of sort of more equitable distribution of wealth, just for everything in terms of replicating that support mechanism when it came to wealth and consumption that the property market used to provide, you need something else to do it. And the only viable alternative is the stock market or capital markets writ large, bonds and whatnot, but really it’s the stock market.
So, that’s the other thing. For all of China’s ambition about driving consumption and supporting middle class, you need a vibrant rising stock market. And then the third thing is China’s rapidly aging population. China’s pension system is chronically underfunded. One thing that would really help redress that problem, or not redress it, but at least ease some of the pressure on the government to come up with the funds to finance an increasing number of retirees retirement is if the stock market was gradually rising and sort of generating additional wealth.
And so, you put all that together, and so far as Beijing is concerned, it can’t afford for the stock market to be a sideshow anymore. And so, it’s very much at the center of Beijing’s vision of its kind of new economy. But to realize that vision, and this gets to what you said a minute ago, to realize that vision, it’s not enough to share prices having to rise. They do have to rise. But it’s not a question of just rising today or tomorrow over the next six months. It’s this idea of China needing a slow bull market. And so, a slow bull market is what the United States has, for what? I don’t know, 80 years?
So, yeah, there’s corrections and there are crises and people lose money. So, the stock market’s going up and all of a sudden it collapses quite aggressively during the tech bubble in the dotcom bubble around the turn of the century. And then you have the global financial crisis. But even with crises like that, when you zoom out over the decades, that line keeps on moving up into the right. That’s what the stock market does. Like, when you put your money in and sit back decades later, when everything evens out, you’ll get robust returns averaged out over the course of how many decades. So, that’s kind of been the great success of the U.S. stock markets. But China doesn’t have that.
So, if you just look over the past 15 years, China’s markets are mostly just moved sideways, which is mind-blowing because, over that period of time, you’ve had nominal economic growth in China. So, inflation plus real growth has been, at times, around 10% annually. And that none of that has been reflected in the stock market. I mean, it’s mostly moved sideways. So, if you compare what China’s stock markets have done compared to the New York Stock Exchange over that same 15-year period, China’s markets have produced very little wealth for anybody who would have been invested 15 years ago. Whereas in the United States, the New York Stock Exchange has effectively tripled and the indexes has tripled. So, that kind of gives you an idea — China wants what the United States has, which this is idea of regardless of fluctuations from month to month or year to year, the market just keeps on rising gradually over the long term, which makes it this incredible engine of wealth creation.
And it is something that China doesn’t have. And, all of a sudden, for those reasons I just outlined before, needs it like never before.
Andrew:
Yeah. Well, before I go back to Wu Qing and kind of what he is doing, one thing I just want to dig in on a little bit further, and I hate to give the Chinese government too much credit here, but I mean, the increase in the stock market, although it is kind of a recent phenomenon from just past few months, has always seemed to me sort of the flip side of the coin of the property re-rendering or property realignment, whatever you want to call it, right? I mean, yes, the property, it’s a little bit ironic in that the property market meltdown or realignment, whatever you want to call it, again, is the number one thing holding back macroeconomic growth in China, for sure.
It’s just this huge weight around the economy’s neck. The Party, in the senior leadership in China, has said, “We’re going to ride this out because we want the economy to be less reliant on real estate as a driver of growth.” But all that savings has to go somewhere. And the most natural place is the stock market. And the authorities don’t always draw a super clear line. But if you kind of read a lot of these documents together like we do, it’s pretty clear that they don’t want the property market to be the same sort of wealth as it was before, and they want the stock market to be the store of wealth because it actually works.
Not only can it create wealth for citizens, but it can also fund innovative companies. So, you get a two-for-one. Innovative companies get funding and people get wealthy, as those companies succeed. So, I mean, I guess we’ll get into this idea that people are saying, “Well, how can the stock market be roaring when the economy sucks?” Well, it’s kind of two sides of the same coin. The property market totally mapped the economy, but also the weak property market is probably doing some to support flows, domestic flows into the equity market. Do you think that’s right? And do you think, am I like giving authorities too much credit for kind of trying to engineer that on a broad basis?
Dinny:
Look, I think you’re right on one level in the sense that, yeah, clearly, they don’t want money going into property because, ultimately, it’s not a particularly productive use of the nation’s savings. When you have a choice between putting it into a new apartment building or putting it into, say, Alibaba, which is using the funds to develop AI technology, sure, you might think too much money is going into AI, or maybe Alibaba is not the best institution to be doing it. Regardless of what you think, though, if the alternative is another apartment block, then clearly it’s far more productive sort of putting it into companies that are sort of putting it to a productive use. So, yeah, that’s clearly what they want.
In terms of whether they’ve been able to engineer this in any way, look, I think probably the bigger issue is if people are putting money into the market and it has something to do with this reallocation from property, then ultimately it’s because interest rates are so low, people have just run out of places to put their money. They can’t put it in property. Interest rates are getting lower and lower, which means the bond market isn’t a particularly attractive place to put it either. People are just coming around, just looking for somewhere that they might be able to get a semi-decent return, and maybe, all of a sudden, they saw a potential in the stock market.
You know, it’s sort of the last institution or the last asset class standing because nowhere else promises anything remotely appealing.
Andrew:
Good point. I guess wealth management products, which were kind of in their heyday when you and I were in Beijing, 2012, 2013, are linked with interest rates as well these days. So they’re not giving particularly high returns.
Dinny:
Absolutely. I mean, they’re stuck with deposits and bonds. I mean, really, there’s nothing that creative about them anymore. Yeah. They’re not offering the returns they once did.
Andrew:
So, stock market is the last man standing. That’s interesting. Let’s try this back now to Wu Qing. What has he done kind of over the last 18 months to try and realize this slow bull market? So, we’ve said a lot of this is not government engineering. It’s sort of just more structural forces seeming to take place. But there has been some government efforts. Walk us through what he’s done.
Dinny:
Yeah. Well, it’s been quite radical. So, I think it can broadly be broken into three areas. First, what they’re trying to do is rebuild trust by imposing discipline on the market. The Chinese public has very low trust in China’s stock markets, has always been, since that the only people who actually make money out of it are insiders. So, the first thing they’re trying to do is build trust by imposing discipline. The second thing is they’re trying to rebalance who’s investing away from mom-and-pop investors, retail investors, which have always had a disproportionately large representation in China’s stock markets, and trying to rebalance it towards long-term investors. What Chinese authorities have taken to calling ‘patient capital.’
And then the third thing is they’re trying to deliver real returns. Now, oddly enough, the last one has been the easiest one, which sounds quite counterintuitive given how badly the market’s been performing until recently. But what’s happened over the last 18 months is that Beijing has put a lot of pressure on listed companies to issue dividends, which, traditionally, have been pretty rare. So, not only just issuing dividends, but ideally issuing multiple dividends each year. And they’ve also been encouraging companies to do buyback schemes as a way to return value to shareholders as well.
And the PBoC has been supporting that with cheap lending facility. I’m not sure if it’s a relending facility, but either way, the PBoC is providing cheap credit for companies to be able to borrow to buy back their own stocks. And so, also so part and parcel of the same thing is that, and this was one of the moves they made very early on, is they force securities companies and fund management companies to cut the fees that they charge their clients. Again, just a very basic way to ensure that ordinary people investors are getting a better return when they invest in the stock market. Also then there was that second idea of trying to encourage patient, long-term investors to play a greater role in the market.
The main way it’s done this is, firstly, by telling the National Social Security Fund, which is part of China’s state-run pension scheme, telling it to allocate more of its capital to the stock market. And also by telling insurance companies to invest more as well. So, with the insurance companies, the first big move I think they made was in January this year, where they told the insurance companies that they should invest 30% of all new premiums in the stock market. Up until that point, it was only 21%. And then in May, the financial regulator said it was changing the capital requirements rules for insurance companies, effectively reducing them, freeing up a lot of capital for the insurance companies, but on the proviso that they didn’t invest that in the stock market.
And the local media was estimating that might free up as much as 140 billion renminbi. So, there is some talk that maybe this rally has been influenced, or at least in part, by an influx of insurance company money coming into the stock market. So, this is certainly something that Beijing has been pushing for. Again, I don’t have a good sense one way or the other, but if so, this is kind of part of Beijing’s larger plan that it will have patient institutions that are less likely to sell, more likely to play the long game, that are staffed with professional investors that will result in a more stable market, and ultimately a market that will rise over the long term.
And then that last piece that I mentioned, rebuilding trust, now, that perhaps is the hardest component because, as I said, people just don’t have that much faith in the market. But this has really been a full-court press on the part of the authorities. And it’s taken a bunch of different forms, and not just from the securities regulator, I mean, almost everybody is involved in this — the Ministry of Finance, the courts, the Public Security Bureau, the financial regulator. So, we’ve got things like the courts have promised to go after financial crimes more aggressively. The securities regulator is exercising far greater oversight of who gets to do an IPO.
They have imposed rules to prevent the revolving door of securities regulators going straight into the financial sector once they retire. They have been tightening the financial penalties for corporate malfeasance, explicitly with the goal of ensuring that crime doesn’t pay. This sort of like matching the fine to be commensurate to the amount of wealth that some financial criminal behavior sort of managed to extract from the system in the first place. They’re trying to lock up founder stocks for a longer period of time, and they’re making it harder for company insiders to sell their shares. And they’re trying to build a better system for protecting whistleblowers.
They’re forcing zombie companies that are listed to delist. I mean, it’s moving in a dozen different directions, all at once. But the overall goal is to rebuild trust in the system. And this stuff is hard because it’s, firstly, about doing all these little different changes all at once to impose a cultural change on the market. But even if you manage to change the culture of the financial institutions and the people working for themselves, that that’s only the first step. The second step is to then ensure that investors and the public know about it and believe in the change, and believe sufficiently that things have changed for the long term, such that they’re now willing to put their money into the market for the long term and really invest in stocks in the way that they used to invest in property.
So, that’s kind of the oversight. It’s very much a three-pronged approach to trying to overhaul the way that the market works with the goal of building this slow bull market.
Andrew:
Well, you said this stuff is really hard, which I agree, but the, I guess, corollary question to that is, is it even feasible to get this stuff done? I mean, we have seen waves of reform in the stock market and China’s financial markets over the past several decades, many times. And yet we’re still in this position where the stock market is seen as unreliable as casino. There’s not trust. So, why should anybody think that it’s going to be feasible or successful to push through these reforms this time?
Dinny:
Yeah. Well, I think there’s two ways of looking at this. You can say yes, it’s feasible because it’s been done before. So, China isn’t reinventing the wheel here. Other countries, they’ve overhauled their capital markets in ways that result in a far greater role for institutional investors. So, Sweden did exactly that in the 1990s. a slightly different approach, I mean, of course, different system, different conditions. But it managed to change it in a way that long-term, patient capital, institutional investors became a much bigger part of the market, and it really reinvigorated the financial system. And other countries have overhauled the corporate governance of listed companies as a precursor to market recovery. So, I think perhaps, most recently, we seen this in Japan, which did it in 2015.
I mean, really, Japan’s stock market had been underperforming since the bubble burst in the late ’80s, but rolled out a fairly sweeping and comprehensive raft of corporate governance reforms in 2015. And, initially, the market really didn’t respond at all. But after about 12 months, valuation started rising, and they’ve been rising ever since. And those reforms are being seen as being at least partly responsible. But, of course, the real question that you were posing is, is it feasible in China? And as you point out, I mean, it’s never really worked before. They’ve been trying to make the stock market better for, I guess, decades at this point. But I think it’s important to keep in mind that this time the stakes are different and the goal is different for the reasons I outlined before.
They really do need to make this work, not for the sake of a stock market, but for the sake of the broader economy. I mean, the real question here is, is the rally a reaction to any of these changes? Is it really a reflection of the public sentiment towards the market? Is the public sentiment towards the market changing? And the thing is, I don’t really know. And it might actually be a false dawn. Not least because even if Beijing puts all these reforms in place, even if people are starting to react to them and feel positive towards them, people still need a reason to invest, right? And, as you pointed out before, all the deflation and overcapacity and the weak property market, that should still be a disincentive for people to be investing in the stock market.
And I think that brings us to the last piece of the puzzle. And that is Beijing realizes it’s not just enough to reform the market. It also needs to turn the market into a place that people actively want to put their money. And that means kind of needing to build a story about the opportunity that the stock market brings. And the story they ultimately want to tell is that the Chinese stock markets are a place where highly innovative, fast-growing firms are listed, and this will create wealth and, by extension, it’ll be an incentive for people to invest. And this is certainly how Fang Xinghai, who was, until recently, one of the deputies at the CSC, he reached retirement age recently and retired, but he pretty much pitched this to investors in the UK last year, pretty much more or less how I’ve kind of laid it out today.
It’s like, “Hey, we’ve got companies issuing dividends, which wasn’t the case before, we’re improving corporate governance, and, ultimately, this is a great market to invest in because we’re going to have all these innovative companies listing.” Of course, that part of the picture really hasn’t kind of clicked into place yet. At the moment, it seems that China’s most innovative companies that are doing IPOs have a preference to go overseas, and specifically Hong Kong. And until that changes, until the mainland exchanges are the ones that are really starting to list all the innovative companies that China is trying to cultivate at the moment, then it’s only then that the markets will kind of be this place of opportunity, and the whole picture will come together.
So, we’re not quite there yet. But I think, if they can manage to do that and overhaul the actual functioning of the market, then, conceivably, they’ll be able to pull this off. But, I mean, they’ve really got to play the long game with this. Clearly, I think Beijing is hoping that this rally is the start of a slow bull market, and it is, at least in part, a result of some of the hard work they’ve put in over the 18 months. But I think it’d be absolutely premature to say that that is the case. And, personally, I think it’ll probably take a little bit more time for all of this stuff to come together.
Andrew:
Well, we’ll see. there’s a lot of moving parts here and very kind of structural stuff happening, a lot of very deep reform kind of movements to try to get more money in the stock market, like you said, create this bull market. But I’ve seen Chinese policy advisors and economists arguing that one thing that might give the increase in stock prices a little bit more room to run is if the fed, the U.S. fed starts cutting rates and the U.S. economy starts weakening, right? That just kind of boosts liquidity globally, often kind of pushing some risk into emerging markets. So, they are certainly hoping that this rally can sustain for a while. And here I have to nail you down, I mean, like everybody wants to know, how much further is this rally going to go, Dinny? So are the Chinese economists right? And how much higher can the CSI 300 go before this thing peters out? What’s your answer?
Dinny:
Dude, you don’t pay me enough to be able to pontificate on this sort of stuff. I have no idea.
Andrew:
Here’s where we say this podcast does not constitute investment advice.
Dinny:
Exactly.
Andrew:
All right. Well, you’re holding back the real answers for, I guess, your own portfolio. Or we could also say, if you want the real answers to these questions, you got to pay us. You got to go to the site and reach out. It’s a good plug for our market service. All right. Well, let’s leave it there. Man. This is great. A lot of food for thought. I appreciate you walking me through it all today. Thanks for your time.
Dinny:
No worries. It’s been great talking to you.
Andrew:
Yeah, of course. Great as always. Thanks, everybody, for listening. We’ll see you next time. Bye, everybody.
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