Transcript (courtesy of the fantastic CadreScripts) further down the page. Image by Keya Zhou. Listen in the embedded player above!
This week on Sinica, I speak with Joe Studwell, whose 2013 book How Asia Works gave a generation of readers a usable account of how East Asia got rich. His new book, How Africa Works: Success and Failure on the World’s Last Developmental Frontier, is one of the most educational things I’ve read in years. We talk about why low population density, more than corruption or ethnic conflict, held the continent back; about Ethiopia, which under Meles Zenawi studied Taiwan and South Korea harder than anyone; about what is and isn’t distinctively Chinese in China’s own development; and about what Chinese firms and lenders are actually after in Africa.
08:02 – From Asia to Africa
11:44 – The population density constraint
20:32 – Disease, elephants, and absent land reform
28:12 – The education catch-up
37:10 – Meles Zenawi’s developmental state
49:17 – Ethiopia’s missteps: METEC, federalism, war
01:05:08 – China on the ground in Ethiopia
01:14:12 – Is China sui generis?
01:17:26 – Which African states come closest
01:22:12 – What Chinese firms want in Africa
01:27:29 – America’s retreat, China’s opening
Paying It Forward: Joe names Kurtis Lockhart, founder and director of the Africa Urban Lab at the African School of Economics in Zanzibar, for his work on urbanization; and Eric Pohlman, co-founder and CEO of One Acre Fund, which supports smallholder farmers across Africa.
Recommendations:
Joe: Anthony Burgess’s 1980 novel Earthly Powers.
Kaiser: Made in Ethiopia (2024), the documentary by Xinyan Yu and Max Duncan, and the directors’ interview with Eric Olander and Cobus van Staden on the China in Africa Podcast; and a visit to Mexico City.
Also mentioned:
Maria Repnikova, Competing for Soft Power: China’s Image-Making in Africa (Cambridge University Press, 2026), the subject of an upcoming episode
Feyi Fawehinmi’s conversation with Joe at the Africa in the World festival, and his read-along of the book at 1914 Reader
Wale Lawal, founder of The Republic
Transcript
Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to the Sinica Podcast, the weekly discussion of current affairs in China. In this program, we look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that can help us better understand what’s happening in China’s politics, foreign relations, economics, and society. Join me each week for in-depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to how we think and talk about China.
I’m Kaiser Kuo coming to you this week from Mexico City.
Listeners, please support my work by becoming a paying subscriber at sinicapodcast.com. Yeah, I get how all these Substack subscriptions can really start to add up. I just did one this morning, but I try and offer a lot. So you get the Sinica Chinese Phrase of the Week from Andrew Methven, get podcasts and roundups from the terrific folks at Trivium, the indispensable China Global South podcast, historian Jay Carter’s This Week in China’s History, the You Can Learn Chinese Podcast, and now in a new weekly feature, which I hope you’re enjoying, a Europe-China perspective from Limen, which is a strategic advisory based here in China, run by René Ruschmeier, a German fellow who’s an excellent analyst and a very, very good writer.
Please do subscribe, so I can continue to bring you these conversations, these essays, and a lot more. My guest today is Joe Studwell. If you’ve spent any time at all thinking seriously about how East Asia developed, how East Asia got rich, you’ve almost certainly run into his 2013 book, How Asia Works, which did something I think very few books on development ever really managed. It gave ordinary readers a usable paradigm on how it actually accomplished it. Household agriculture first, export manufacturing second, a financial system bent to serve both of these. And it did it in prose that you could actually enjoy.
Before that, Joe wrote The China Dream about the recurring foreign fantasy of the China market and Asian Godfathers about the tycoons of Southeast Asia and of Hong Kong. Now, he’s been thinking about this part of the world for a very long time and thinking about it very well. So it was a surprise, perhaps to him as much as anyone, that his new book is about Africa, How Africa Works: Success and Failure on the World’s Last Developmental Frontier. It’s out this year from Profile Books. And I want to say something about it before we start because I don’t often get to say this on the show.
As regular listeners will know, I was on a summer-long nonfiction fast. For months, I’d been reading nothing but novels, and I broke the fast, actually, with this book. I actually can’t think of a better one to have broken it with. This is one of the most educational reading experiences I’ve had in years, in part, of course, because I came to it knowing embarrassingly little about Africa. I came out of it not with a pile of facts, but with a way of thinking about a continent of 55 countries, a framework I could actually carry around and test my ideas against, and that’s rare. And I want to say why I think the writing works because it’s not an accident. I think Joe writes with a kind of plain confidence.
He’s not afraid of a number. The book is full of them, but every number is actually put to good use, put to real work. And almost every African figure is set beside an Asian one at a comparable stage of development. So you’re never asked to be just impressed or appalled in a vacuum. You learn that Ethiopia at its peak had 21 agricultural extension agents for every 10,000 farmers. And in the same breath that China, which is celebrated for exactly this kind of thing, had just 16. He’s equally unafraid of rendering a judgment. He’ll call a constitution a profound mistake, the federal system of Ethiopia as we will get to, and a flagship industrial policy he will call a vote-buying scheme, and he’ll tell you why. Then there is the reporting. I mean, he did field work in a dozen countries.
The book is just full of really nice reported scenes, lots of color, you know, farmers in Oromia in Ethiopia sitting under an acacia tree, telling him that their wheat yields have nearly doubled and that their new problem is that they have nowhere to store the grain. A prime minister with a fertilizer status board in his office, 600 districts that are coded red, yellow, and green. Actually, getting on the phone, telephoning these officials in charge of the red ones, where the fertilizer is a problem. The book is moving constantly between the view from 30,000 feet or whatever to the view very much on the ground.
And that kind of alternation is what makes a book about economic development actually hard to put down. It’s not something I ever expected I would be saying. Now, this is a China podcast, of course, and the book is not about China. China appears in it, to be sure, but mostly as a yardstick, a contractor, a lender, occasionally as kind of an object lesson. But there are two things I really hope to get at in this conversation that are very much about China.
The first is what Joe’s years of research on the ground have really revealed to him about China’s involvement in African development, what he saw of it in a dozen countries, how it may have shifted his sense of the whole phenomenon of China in Africa, how the Chinese are regarded by the people he talked to, and where they have been more successful and less so, and why. The second thing I really hope to get at is something I have puzzled over for a long time.
We talk about the East Asian developmental model as if it were a thing, one thing. And we talk about China often as if it were either the ultimate expression of that model or something entirely its own. Ethiopia, which Joe says went all in on the Asian model, is about as good a kind of natural lab, a natural experiment as we’re ever going to get. It’s a large, poor, landlocked country that studied under Meles, it studied Taiwan and South Korea really, harder than any government in East Asia has ever studied anything and then tried to actually put it into practice.
So what does Ethiopia’s experience tell us about which features of that model actually are transferable? And what, if anything, in the Chinese version of it is specifically Chinese? Is China, in other words, sui generis, or is it just the East Asian model at a scale nobody had ever seen before? That’s actually a question that isn’t settled in my own mind. I’m kind of agnostic on it and really hoping to hear what Joe has to say on the matter. We’re going to spend a lot of time on Ethiopia because that chapter is, well, I mean, in my reading of it, kind of the heart of the book. And for a China watcher, it’s the most fascinating thing in it.
I also want to mention that I’m going to start another book on China and Ethiopia by Maria Repnikova, and I’m planning to have her on the show to talk about it. So, consider this the first half of a two-part Ethiopian fixation. Joe Studwell, welcome at last to Sinica.
Joe Studwell: Thank you very much. It’s lovely to be with you, Kaiser.
Kaiser: You know, by wild coincidence, so I said I’m in Mexico City, I was on a panel with somebody who actually interviewed you about the book recently, Feyi Fawehinmi.
Joe: Yes, yes, yes. Down in Cape Town, Feyi. Yeah.
Kaiser: And just last night at dinner, I was treated to a wonderfully rich graduate-level conversation with a Lagos-based developmental economist named Wale Lawal, who founded the magazine The Republic in Nigeria. It was a conversation in which I was able to participate, thanks in large part to just having finished your excellent book. So thank you very much, Joe, for that.
Joe: You’re welcome.
Kaiser: So let me start with the obvious question, which you actually anticipate in the first paragraph of your book itself, which is: what is somebody who’s known for his work on Asia doing, publishing this sweeping book on development in Africa? I mean, you told the story of the Ethiopian and Rwandan governments inviting you in 2016, and you’re telling them it would be pointless because you knew nothing about Africa, and they’re insisting that it didn’t matter.
They wanted to talk about Asian policy and to benchmark themselves. And then I guess you have this encounter with Bill Gates. Anyway, walk us through how this whole thing became a book. I’m curious what you had to, among other things, what you had to unlearn along the way, what assumptions from 30 years of working on Asia turned out to be useless or maybe even worse than useless when you landed in Kigali or in Addis.
Joe: Well, what you say, Kaiser, was what got it going. Their invites from the Ethiopian and the Rwandan governments, and Ethiopia in particular, really impressed me. And then that was followed by this meeting with Gates, and he was saying, “Oh, what I really want to know is what is what you think about Africa because that’s where I’m spending my money.” And Gates was sort of connected with me via the How Asia Works book because he’d flagged that as a book that he liked and he’d written about it.
He’d blogged about it. So, that’s how I got involved really at the beginning. At the beginning, I started out thinking that maybe there would be some special African sauce in policy terms as to what was necessary to development. Over the course of five years, when I wasn’t doing this book full-time, but I was doing it a lot of the time. I was disabused of that idea because where I found success in Africa, I found that it was connected to exactly the same policies that we associate with rapid economic growth in East Asia. So, it was the focus on smallholder farming and agriculture more broadly.
It was the focus on manufacturing and subsidy given to manufacturing, but conditioned on exports, which demonstrate that recipients of subsidies are producing globally competitive goods. And it was also to do with a certain amount of manipulation of the financial system in terms of having capital controls to trap savings at home, and also having banking systems, either private banking systems or public banking systems could be directed to lend to the developmental targets that were set by the government.
So those things actually over the course of the research turned out to be the same, and that, for better or for worse, came as something of a surprise to me. I thought Africa was going to be different, but subsequently, at the end of the book, I thought, why did I think it was going to be different when, in fact, what we think of as the East Asian model isn’t really the East Asian model at all, because it comes into Japan originally from Germany and other European countries, which in turn get much of their inspiration from the protectionist policies that were used by the United States originally, and which were a big influence on Germany.
So, we call it an East Asian model, but it’s really just the best global model that we have for rapid economic development. So, that was that bit of it. The bit that was completely different was the context in Africa, which is totally different to anything that we know in East Asia.
Kaiser: Let’s get into that because the book’s core argument is that Africa’s relative poverty comes down to, for you, three historical factors, right? One is chronically low population density. A second is what you call low-budget colonialism and the initial conditions that those two things produced. Your phrase is societies that were dispersed, fragmented, uneducated, and politically unorganized. And you say quite pointedly that it is this combination and not the usual suspects of corruption, kleptocratic regimes, ethnic violence, that placed a ceiling over Africa’s prospects.
It’s a big claim. I’m not familiar with all that much of the literature. I imagine it cuts against a great deal of the literature. So, Joe, how did you arrive at demographics as the master variable? I think many people don’t think of Africa now because it’s so rapidly growing in population. We don’t think of it that way. I mean, what kind of pushback have you had or might you expect from people who’ve spent careers on governance and institutions focusing on those things when you basically present them with this problem of low population density? Some remarkable statistics that were really surprising to me.
Joe: Yeah, I mean, so far, to begin with the question about pushback, I haven’t really had pushback more. I’ve had people in academia saying, “Yeah, it’s odd how the demographic stuff was shoved to the side.” I began the research process by reading big chunks of academic literature, reading through literature on governance, which in Africa tends to focus on patrimonial leadership. So, the arguments are essentially that




