China’s anti-involution campaign is about two years old. For most of it, Beijing tried to make progress with closed-door symposiums, warnings to the worst offenders, and pledges of “industry self-discipline.” It didn’t work.
Solar is in roughly its fourteenth consecutive quarter of losses. Auto margins fell to about 1.5% in H1, from nearly 8% in 2017. And China’s auto sales this year are tracking below where they were in 2014 — twelve years of growth, gone.
But in recent months, Beijing has stopped trying to persuade firms and started closing the channels that enable them to pursue price wars.
It’s a far more coherent approach than anything that’s come before, but will it deliver the solution Beijing — let alone Europe — wants?
On this episode, Dinny McMahon (Trivium’s Head of Markets Research) fills in for regular host Andrew Polk. He sits down with Cosimo Ries (Trivium’s Head of Clean Energy and EV Research) to unpack:
Why two years of jawboning failed
How Beijing is closing the channels that fund price wars
Why forcing firms to sell above cost was ever necessary
Why capacity cuts are the step Beijing keeps deferring
Give it a listen – and read Cosimo’s deep dive, From price to cost: Beijing’s new involution playbook, while you’re at it.
Transcript
Dinny McMahon: Hi, everybody, and welcome to the latest Trivium China Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I am your host, Head of China markets research, Dinny McMahon, filling in for Andrew Polk. And today I’m joined by Cosimo Ries, Trivium’s head of clean energy and EV research. Cosimo, how are you doing?
Cosimo Ries: Yeah, doing all right. It’s a cold and polluted day here in Beijing, but I don’t have much else to complain.
Dinny: It’s good to hear that the more things change, the more they stay the same. So Cosimo, the reason we got Cosimo on the show today is he has recently written for us a fascinating essay on involution and how China’s approach to dealing with it has changed fairly radically over recent months. But before we get to that, it would be incredibly remiss of me, and Andrew would never forgive me, if we did not do the customary vibe check. So, Cosimo, how’s your vibe today?
Cosimo: Yeah, my vibe is alright. It’s getting cold here, but other than that, it’s all good.
Dinny: Well, fair enough. It is that time of year in Beijing; once we’re past the National Day holiday, the weather is all downhill from here. As for me, my vibe, I am in countdown mode. My wife has been away for almost two weeks, and it’s just been me and the two kids, and I’m counting down the days. Actually, I’m counting down the hours until she gets back on Saturday night.
Now, I shouldn’t complain too much. I’ve been doing this for a few years now, and, frankly, the kids are much better at this than they used to be. But still, I always kind of feel a bit exhausted by the time she walks in the front door. So that’s me. I’m counting the minutes. But anyway, before we get into the content, we also have to do the quick housekeeping up top.
So, a quick reminder, we are not just a podcast here. Trivium China is a strategic advisory firm that helps businesses and investors navigate the China policy landscape. That, of course, includes domestic policy in China, much of which we’ll talk about today, but it also includes policy towards China out of the Western capitals like D.C. and London and Brussels and others. So, if you need any help on that front, please reach out to us at hq@triviumchina.com. We’d love to have a conversation about how we can support your business or your fund.
Or if you just have comments on the pod, reach out to us. We always love to hear your feedback from our listeners. And then, finally, please do tell your friends and colleagues about Trivium, both about the business and about the podcast. It really helps us grow the company, and we truly appreciate the word-of-mouth recommendations. And while you’re at it, please leave us a rating on your favorite podcast platform. So, with that out of the way, let’s get into it. Cosimo, are you ready?
Cosimo: Yeah, I’m good.
Dinny: Okay. Well, today we’re talking about involution, aka industrial overcapacity. And this has been a real bug in China’s relationship with the EU in particular, but also the United States. And overcapacity is one of those things that’s really difficult to define, which is something Beijing has actually made quite a big deal of. But it’s also the sort of thing where you kind of know it when you see it, which Beijing has played into by talking about involution rather than overcapacity, which has really muddied the waters further.
But regardless of what is overcapacity and what isn’t, the EU in particular has kind of held out hope that all Beijing’s talk of dealing with involution would translate into a more even playing field for European firms, or at least translate into some breathing space. That said, progress on the Chinese side has been going very slowly, but it finally looks like we might have a coherent approach to dealing with involution.
And Cosimo is going to talk to us about what that approach is and its implications for the rest of the world. So, to set the scene on this, Cosimo, let’s start off with, I was going to say an easy one, but it’s not that easy, what is involution? Why does Beijing talk about involution rather than overcapacity? What really is the problem here Beijing is trying to fix?
Cosimo: So yeah, I mean, I think as you alluded to at the beginning, Beijing does not want to admit that it has an overcapacity problem. I think the reality is that overcapacity is at the heart and an absolutely the primary driver of involution. And so what we’ve seen is basically since the early 2020s, a number of industries, mostly solar, autos, batteries, wind, and so on, where there’s been this massive collective capacity overexpansion as firms began chasing pretty hefty profits at the time.
And so, yeah, I mean, a lot of it aided by local government industrial policy approaches and backstop by Beijing’s passive acknowledgment of where these industries should be headed. And so, yeah, now we’re in a situation where there’s just too much capacity and too many companies chasing what is too little demand even at the global stage. Even as demand has been growing very, very rapidly over the past couple of years, it’s not been able to keep up with the supply-side expansion.
I think that’s absolutely the key issue at heart here. And I think what we’re seeing now is, yeah, basically a kind of prisoner’s dilemma situation where after, yeah, three years or so of, yeah, incessant price wars, where, yeah, a big chunk of the corporate profits in these industries have been wiped out either entirely or in negative territory.
And ultimately, I say that it’s a prisoner dilemma situation because companies in the industry all want it to stop because nobody is really benefiting from this. But you can’t really stop because if you stop, someone is going to undercut you. And so, yeah, all you can do is keep this up. And yeah, it’s a very, very toxic situation, I think, for these industries where it’s their mind, a big chunk of China’s global technology leadership in these spaces where they’re not able to reap the corresponding profit margins that they should have within their positions.
Yeah. And the global supply chains, which is, I think, ultimately one of the main pain points here that Beijing is trying to resolve ultimately. I think we’re in this really kind of ironic situation where firms, Chinese companies are finding themselves churning out world-class clean tech products and shipping them around the world and almost doing it as a public service, right? Because the prices are so cheap, and they’re selling below cost.
And so, yeah, I think that’s a big part of it. And I think it’s also especially striking when you look back at the early 2020s, late 2010s, right? When it was the height of the global clean tech euphoria, right? You had companies like Nio that was, in 2020, they were selling like 40,000 cars and were more valuable on the U.S. stock markets than companies like Volkswagen. We had solar panel companies like LONGJI that was about as valuable as Airbus. And yeah, now obviously it all went to hell in the meantime.
Dinny: I can’t help but bring up Chinese over capacity as public service. I mean, when I finally buy a BYD, I think I’ll get that put on the bumper sticker. You said that you’ve had a bunch of industries in China that have been engaged in price wars for three years. Is that when Beijing’s efforts to deal with involution, its anti-involution efforts really kicked off? Were you talking about three years ago? And I guess the other thing is, when it first started talking about the need to fix involution, how did Beijing initially approach it?
Cosimo: Yeah. So for us that follow these industries closely, I think it was already pretty evident back in 2020 that solar and EVs were heading for a really almighty reckoning with all the wave of capacity expansions that were announced that just made no sense collectively. But, obviously, from a corporate level, you kind of had to do it because if you didn’t, someone else would be a bigger, more effective, more modern factory that made better goods and actually wipe out whatever you had to offer.
So, it was a kind of prisoner’s dilemma situation there. But yeah, I mean, I think in terms of where the overcapacity campaign actually began, I think it’s definitely debatable, but I think the first time we saw it mentioned at a very high level was back in, I think, July 2024 at one of the Politburo meetings. At the time, they talked about involution. Yeah, and then it’s just been a steady kind of stream of policies and op-eds and so on that have come out.
So it’s hard to say exactly when it started, but probably anywhere from kind of two, two and a half years ago to two years ago, something like that is probably a good starting point when the whole anti-evolution campaign really came into focus. And I mean, that’s one. And then, yeah, in terms of like what the approach has been today, I think a big part of what we’ve seen is stuff like closed-door symposiums or regulators summoning some of the leading companies to try and get them to act more kind of strategically, to not try and undercut each other too hard, to try and, you know, maintain a basic degree of price discipline and supply-side manufacturing and coordinating output.
But yeah, trying to force firms to act more kind of coordinated manner on the supply side, basically not try and flood the market and try and force other rivals into bankruptcy by engaging in really kind of cutthroat pricing, which I mean, either way has not worked at all, I think, as some of the bigger companies in autos or solar, for example, we’re hoping to do, right? So, it’s a lot of this, and really trying to summon companies that are the drivers of the price wars that we’ve seen and basically warning them, and so on.
And yeah, again, trying to, I think, mostly engage in this form of industry self-discipline, as they call it, which I think, for the most part, has proven to be very, very ineffective so far, right? It goes in waves where these companies and industries will try and then quickly realize that it doesn’t work. It doesn’t really achieve their kind of objective. And so then they go back to ramping up output and cutting prices and trying to force smaller players out of the market.
And yeah, I think one of the big surprises how ineffective the big companies have been in doing this, really kind of forcing their weight onto their weaker peers. And so, yeah, I think that’s kind of what we’ve seen so far for the most part.
Dinny: So, it’s fair to say then that for the most part of the first two years of this campaign, or maybe 18 months to two years, they didn’t really make any headway at all. I mean, it was a lot of sort of browbeating firms using the bully pulpit, trying to convince the firms to do what they were told. And they didn’t really translate into any real gains. And when I say gains, I mean, we didn’t see a meaningful reduction in capacity. We didn’t see a meaningful end of the price wars. Any of the symptoms of involution, none of them really were mitigated in any meaningful way. Is that a fair summary?
Cosimo: Yeah, I think it’s fair to kind of summarize it like that. And I think obviously this is a huge issue that is going to be very, very hard to resolve. I don’t think you can expect Beijing to be able to kind of snap its finger and resolve all of these issues when we’ve been thousands of companies and local governments have sunken huge amounts of resources into this, a very, very complex political economy issue.
But I think, yeah, absolutely. If you look at the solar industry, it’s now in the 13th, 14th consecutive quarter of losses. And I think a lot of the worst part has happened since the anti-involution campaign began. And yeah, I mean, you know, you have several of the big companies now that are close to basically losing the cumulative losses over the three years are like, you know, almost more than they’ve ever made throughout history. The auto industry that’s, you know, seen its recent profit margins fall to something like one and a half percent in H1 this year.
And back in 2017, it was like almost 8%. It was a huge slide. And even compared to say, 2022, 2023, when these price wars are really starting to hit hard. It has been, yeah, terrible. And a lot of that is also to blame on the demand side, right? And all China’s auto sales are in almost free fall this year. So no matter how you try to induce supply-side discipline, that’s going to be very, very hard when the demand is that weak.
You see that with solar too, installations are also in free fall this year. I think that’s also something that’s making the anti-envolution campaign very, very difficult to uphold.
Dinny: With auto, did you write this today that auto sales this year are pretty much at, what was it, 2014 levels? Did I make that up?
Cosimo: No, that’s exactly right. I think it’s worse than 2014.
Dinny McMahon: That is absolutely wild. 12 years of auto sector growth has effectively just disappeared overnight. You can understand why because, sure, we’ve got overcapacity, but the government has been so supportive of boosting sales with tax cuts and subsidies and all this sort of stuff. And ultimately, you reap what you sow, right? You so actively pursue policies that bring forward future demand.
And when you then try and wean the economy off it, you end up in this situation where you go back to sales levels of 12 years ago, which is absolutely mind-blowing. But anyway, that’s by the by. That’s a bit of a tangent. But the reason we got you on today is because you’ve written this note explaining how Beijing’s approach to dealing with involution has changed. So, from 30,000 feet, explain what the new approach is and where we’re seeing it applied.
Cosimo: Yeah, absolutely. So I think in, you know, kind of in simple terms, you know, there have been a lot of channels that companies have used today to fund their incessant price wars and stuff like selling below cost, right? And they’re using loopholes and financial accounting in China’s tax system, whereas VAT rebates and things like that to fund price wars abroad, and so on, using stuff like compromising a product quality, which is something that’s more obscure.
I’m maybe not seeing direct evidence of it can be proved in number, but I think it’s absolutely happening across all these industries. Undermining quality, cutting corners to try and respond to the slide down in margins. And then using stuff like supply chain financing, squeezing their suppliers, and so on, to try and create financial breathing room. So these are all a host of measures that everyone knows has been the norm in a lot of Chinese industries for a long time.
And I think now regulators are taking a more kind of concrete approach to basically tap, blocking all of these outlets at the same time, which I think is basically the core thesis of this deep dive that we’ve written and what we looked at.
Dinny: Yeah, I find the trade receivable thing really interesting because, yeah, I mean, we’re all looking at the Chinese economy from a different perspective. This has been something that’s been on my radar for years, but originally, post-collapse of the property market, one of the reasons we had these rising receivables is because the local governments didn’t have the money to pay the contractors and suppliers for work that they’d already done.
And then it slowly, this problem of people not getting paid, slowly evolved into this involution thing because some of the biggest, most innovative, seemingly successful companies in China were effectively hoarding cash by not paying their suppliers on time, just sort of forcing their own financial stress onto their supply chain. And authorities have certainly been trying to do a lot to fix it. But it’s one of those things where what’s good for one company ends up creating a drag on the economy elsewhere.
But let’s get into the weeds a little bit then. So, you know, that was 30,000 feet. It’s probably fair to say that this approach is being applied most aggressively in the auto sector. So specifically with cars, what measures, what specific measures are being used in this sort of overall approach to kind of have prices reflect costs?
Cosimo: Yeah, absolutely. So maybe we can start with the accounts receivable payment turn stuff that you talked about just now. And yeah, I mean, I think, you know, that’s been a really appalling situation with China’s auto industry for many years now and something that’s really kind of intensified over the past couple of years, where you have big automakers who are... basically if you’re an auto supplier, you just have to kind of do what they say because they’re your big clients. So they have huge bargaining power over you, and they know it. Right?
So facing these kind of incessant price cuts and their margins collapsing. I mean, solution that companies have come to is that, yeah, why don’t we just squeeze our suppliers and, instead of paying them within a month of receiving the goods that delivered, why don’t we do it in six months or even nine months? And that frees up sort of kind of cash flow that they can then ease off kind of any immediate internal financial pressures from all the price wars and all the stuff that we’ve seen. Right? And then obviously this is coming at a cost to the broader industry.
And a lot of companies who are knocked down the chain who had struggled to pay their employees and so on, paid bonuses, whatever it is. And so, yeah, I mean, that’s been a long time coming. And I think, you know, regulators are now starting to, you know, really kind of zero in on this practice. So this began last year when we saw this policy release by the industry ministry where they’ve basically, yeah, almost semi-forced companies to voluntarily agree to shortening these payment terms down to 60 days.
So, we saw this really bizarre wave where within a day, like most of China’s automakers, yeah, released these pledges that they were going to do it. Obviously, it’s down from the regulatory pressures. They’ve set up an online platform that allows suppliers to basically report, you know, abuses by these companies if they continue to go about it.
And obviously, that’s always been the big question is, you know, how does enforcement work in a sense, right? Because suppliers are just going to be just as afraid of reporting and pissing off their biggest customers now as they were before, especially when the auto industry as a whole is in a very, very difficult position, right? So, I think the reality is that in probably the years since this campaign started, it hasn’t really worked, right?
We’ve seen the latest data on the payment terms and, for most automakers, it’s barely shortened compared to last year. So I think this is something now that regulators are starting to zero in on because they released a new policy recently that is very, very heavy on enforcement. And I think it’s a direct acknowledgment that what they’ve been doing so far hasn’t worked, and they’re really trying to basically up the pressure and enforcement and really try and force these type of cash flow pressures eventually onto automakers so they need to stop doing what they’ve been doing so far.
So that’s definitely one of them. And another one is these accounting loopholes that auto companies have been using. So I think as many here know, dumping and selling products below your cost of production is obviously illegal, both in kind of international trade and also within China’s domestic economy. There’s a number of laws that strictly prohibit this. But I think the reality is that that’s exactly what we’ve seen happen in a lot of industries, right? Where companies would, in order to keep cash flows coming in and keeping their factories running and being able to pay their employees salaries, they have been selling below cost.
Yeah. And this is something that ultimately is one of the big drivers of the involution kind of situation, right? Because if someone is willing to go through these lengths, even if you’re trying to uphold of price discipline you can’t because if consumers are valuing price above all else. It’ll be very very hard for you to try and do the right thing and then lose market share to companies who are acting illegally. And a big part of how companies have been able to get around this type of illegal action is by imposing all these accounting loopholes. For example, for the past couple of years, there have been all these auto trade and subsidies that have been played a big role in boosting sales, right?
They’re doing stuff like bundling government subsidies into their internal revenue figures to try and make it like they’re selling at a higher cost than they are. When in reality, that’s obviously the subsidies don’t go into their hands. And you have stuff like, you know, trying to write off stuff like shipping and insurance. Yeah, doing that stuff off books. So yeah, a host of measures like this to try and make costs appear lower than they are or to boost revenues to basically seem like they’re not selling below cost.
This is another new area that regulators are now targeting with this new kind of mandatory kind of standardized industry-wide accounting framework so that, in the future, this type of, you know, creative accounting, in theory, at least, there should be no more place for it. So, these are kind of two. And then there’s also the tax side. Do you want to touch on that now or?
Dinny: Yeah, yeah, please. I think it’s important to give a picture of just how extensive this approach is. When you started writing about it, it really struck me as a full court press, that this isn’t just like they’re trying out one particular approach, they’re forcing proper accounting or they’re trying to force the companies to pay their supplies properly.
It feels like Beijing has mobilized all the various levers of power. They’ve mobilized their accounting tools. They’re mobilizing the financial system when it comes to forcing people to pay their bills. They’re mobilizing the tax system. It feels like a full court press rather than, you know, often you kind of at an experimental stage, one part of government might be trying something, whereas this feels incredibly coherent. So, yeah tell us how taxation fits into the picture.
Cosimo: Yeah, I think I absolutely agree with you here. It’s a very very systematic approach for sure. And taxation is then another kind of part of it and the first one. Obviously, for years now, China has kind of granted rebates on their value added tax for a number of goods exported abroad to try and boost the cost competitiveness of these products in global markets.
And new energy vehicles, so EVs and hybrids are one of these, right? They used to be able to claim a 13% rebate on their VAT, which, I mean, this either kind of helps boost kind of margins for exports overseas, right? which is also one of the drivers of this huge surge in auto exports that we’ve seen out of China to places like Europe and South America, and so on over the past couple of years, which is obviously a big issue now in terms of geopolitics and trade and so on.
It’s either that or companies are then able to really price super aggressively abroad, in some cases, to try and gain market share and also use these profits to try and kind of refund their domestic price war. So, I think regulators are seeing this kind of internal loophole where they’re kind of trying to end the involution campaign, but then are also simultaneously sort of funding it with these VAT rebates.
We’ve seen this earlier, I think two or three months ago; they’ve now scaled down the rebate for NEV exports to 9%. I think, again, if we’re looking at you know for example solar and batteries as precedents who, you know, they’ve had the same imposed on them, last year, I think the reality is that this VAT rebate will be gone likely within the next one or two years. And so, yeah, I mean they’re pulling this sort of funding channel for automakers to try and really basically increase their cost as well so that they calm down on their price wars a little bit. And yeah, there’s also stuff like the regulators are now adding a new consumption tax for batteries that auto companies have to pay. So, it’s 2% tax that didn’t exist before.
And that, again, you know, batteries are core input of electric vehicles and a big part of the overall cost. So they’re adding another lever, or they’re pushing costs onto auto companies. And they’re, basically, I think it’s like, ultimately, a noose around their necks. If you’re not going to act responsibly, we’ll force these series of costs and see if you can keep this up any longer.
Dinny: I think it’s wild that the state feels as though it needs to mobilize the regulatory apparatus to force companies to sell above cost. And I think that just kind of speaks to the idiosyncrasies of the Chinese system, that firms, even nominally private sector firms, can survive for years while generating huge losses. I mean, in a functioning free market economy, firms might be able to do that for a certain period of time, but not for the year after year sort of situation we’ve seen in so many industries in China. And it’s not new either. I mean, China’s been dealing with industrial overcapacity on and off for decades.
And yet the problem is always the same. The reason it sort of keeps popping up is that firms are able to continue to operate despite the fact that they’re not profitable and despite the fact that they’re selling below cost. And so, to kind of impose proper market discipline, the state has to step in and kind of override the various forces that allow firms to be able to endure despite making a loss and force them to sell at reasonable prices, to force them to sell at prices that actually reflect the cost of operation.
It’s absolutely wild. And that then brings us to the question then, what’s your opinion of all of this, right? is this approach likely to be successful? And I guess for that matter as well, what does success in this area, dealing with overcapacity, dealing with evolution, what does success even look like?
Cosimo: Yeah, I mean, that’s a great question. I think, long-term, I think everybody knows that capacity has to come down for these problems to be meaningfully resolved in any way. I think the reality is that that’s obviously good on a macro level, at less capacity, better margins, so on and so forth. But I think the reality is that this, on a micro level, it becomes much more complex, or yet so many local governments that are heavily invested in these companies, right?
It sunk billions in industrial policy funding over the past couple of years. And, you know, if these companies end up going down, right, so they leave a huge hole into a lot of localities that are already struggling financially, right? So, I think that’s, to me at least, one of the main reasons that Beijing has been so kind of hesitant in really pulling the trigger and doing anything meaningful so far because of the potential, kind of ripple effect that this is going to have once you start seeing a big wave of corporate bankruptcies.
So I think, you know, on a macro level, that’s obviously going to be... the ultimate goal here is to do that. But yeah, on a micro level, it becomes so much more complicated. So, local officials may go to prison if found of kind of erosion of state assets under their watch, they’ve lost 10 billion renminbi in a company. And I think the political incentive there also makes it very, very difficult. So I think, yeah, in terms of how I view the prospects of this campaign, I think it’s definitely going to help.
But I think, yeah, there’s definitely a lot of reasons to be pessimistic about how effective this is going to be. And yeah, I mean, I think it’ll obviously differ sector by sector with the solar industry at this point where, yeah, I mean, it’s like you said, incredible that some of these companies have been able to survive this long with how horrendous their margins have been for the past three years.
But you get the feeling that the race is maybe approaching more towards an end because these companies are really... they’re being bled dry almost universally, and something has to give soon. But industries like auto motors, I think, a lot more reason to be pessimistic when you have companies that are really, really big companies, for the most part, most have not experienced the type of losses that we’ve seen that solar, for example, on such a sustained basis, and they’re much bigger company to begin with.
So, they can potentially last much longer just as it is. And not to mention that a lot of auto companies are those kind of pillar industries of their local cities, right? So the governments behind them have an even greater incentive to really prop them up and not allow them to go down.
And yeah, I mean, just the overcapacity is so jarring at this point, right? Even China’s kind of official estimates show that China’s auto industry has got something like enough capacity to manufacture, I think 45 to 50 million vehicles. The domestic market this year will be less than 20 million. We’ve got huge amounts of exports, but even that it will be nowhere enough to plug the gap there. So, yeah, I mean, then we’ve not seen a meaningful structural reduction of that capacity happen really yet.
And these Chinese companies are also building a lot of auto plants around the world now, which I think presumably will eat into their exports relatively soon. So where that heads to, I think, is very, very hard to predict right now.
Dinny: Yeah, I mean, I just realized we didn’t even touch on this sort of phenomenon of Chinese firms, automakers in particular, but it’s certainly not limited to them increasingly building production facilities overseas, partly to get around tariffs, partly because they want to be closer to markets. But it’s a real trend. But anyway, we’ll have to get you back on the podcast again some other time to talk about that because that’s a really big deal as well, and that’s only likely to get bigger.
But for the time being, I’ve got one more question for you, and I think it’s probably the one that a lot of our listeners are most interested in, and that is, well, as I said at the very beginning, the EU in particular has been waiting for China to finally do something about overcapacity. And you said a minute ago that just given the sheer scale and depth of this problem domestically in China, that the race may be nearing an end.
Given that, is this approach of forcing firms to acknowledge the costs involved in production and pricing accordingly, is this approach likely to be the solution that Europe has been waiting for?
Cosimo: Yeah, I’m a little skeptical about the prospects there, personally. Yeah, I think, again, there’s this prisoner’s dilemma issue where companies are really fighting for their survival at this point, and they’re doing anything they can. And they’re seeing, like, for example, the flood of solar modules to Europe over the past couple of years, a lot of it is done. And they’re doing anything they can or finding markets anywhere in the world and exporting super aggressively, pricing super aggressively just to be able to get by.
And I think that dynamic hasn’t really changed. And these levers will definitely make it, disincentivize it to an extent. But I think companies will continue to fight tooth and nail for their survival, which I think, yeah, will make it very, very difficult. I think, yeah, I mean, it does seem like more recently Beijing is, yeah, at least appearing more accommodating to some of Europe’s demands with the recent hybrid vehicle trade understanding.
Are supposedly going to impose this cap on exports and so on. And I mean, stuff like the VAT rebate reduction that we talked about earlier, that will also directly impact, I think, Chinese automakers’ pricing strategy in Europe. And yeah, I mean, some of the localization efforts that we talked about, I think, yeah, in the long term, there is likely to be a compromise, hopefully. But yeah, I think I wouldn’t be too optimistic about the short-term prospects.
Yeah, I think if Europe acts very, very aggressively to try and curb Chinese exports, I think that will still trigger a very strong response from Beijing, even though I think they’re starting to move towards a more accommodating stance from what we’re seeing. So, yeah.
Dinny: Well, look, Cosimo, thank you so much for coming on. I mean, I think you’ve recognized a real policy shift that could have some real meaningful implications over the next year. And frankly, I think you recognized it very early. It’s certainly a space we’re going to be continuing to watch very closely, specifically what additional policies are used to kind of consolidate this approach, and ultimately whether it really starts filtering through in a meaningful way in pricing and, more importantly, whether it sort of manifests itself into an industry shakeup, whether that being in auto sector, in solar, in batteries, or whatever.
I mean, we’re watching as well to see whether this approach gets sort of applied more broadly beyond those kind of key areas. But anyway, look, thanks again for joining me, Cosimo. This has been fantastic.
Cosimo: Yeah, thanks for having me on. I’m happy to be here.
Dinny: And for everybody else, we’ll see you next time. Thanks for joining us.











