Taiwan President Lai Ching-te was forced to cancel a scheduled visit to Eswatini this week after Mauritius, the Seychelles, and Madagascar revoked Lai’s flight permits.
This is also why the usual “China coerced Africa” narrative is too simple. African states are not passive objects moved around by great powers. They make their own calculations. But agency does not always mean defiance. Sometimes it means avoiding a symbolic gesture that offers little upside and substantial downside. Western commentary often treats African alignment with Western preferences as sovereignty, while treating African alignment with Chinese preferences as coercion. That framework misses the reality of how small and middle states navigate a world where China has become a central economic and diplomatic actor.
The larger implication is that the One China principle is no longer just a matter of diplomatic communiqués or UN representation. It is increasingly being operationalized through the small administrative details of international life: flight routes, landing rights, transit permissions, event participation, naming conventions, and protocol. For Taiwan, this means that even visits to its remaining diplomatic partners may become harder to execute. For China, it shows how red lines can be extended through the global system without always requiring direct pressure. For the Global South, it is a reminder that autonomy often takes the form of pragmatic risk management inside a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry.
China’s power lies precisely in the fact that it does not need to issue public threats every time; many countries already know how to avoid crossing its core red lines.
This episode is useful because it pushes back against the most convenient explanation of the incident.
In international politics, power often works through expectations rather than visible commands. Many states already understand where China’s red lines are on Taiwan. For Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar, allowing the aircraft to pass would bring almost no direct benefit, while creating a non-trivial risk of diplomatic friction with Beijing. Refusing the request was therefore a low-cost, low-risk decision.
This is also why the usual “China coerced Africa” narrative is too simple. African states are not passive objects moved around by great powers. They make their own calculations. But agency does not always mean defiance. Sometimes it means avoiding a symbolic gesture that offers little upside and substantial downside. Western commentary often treats African alignment with Western preferences as sovereignty, while treating African alignment with Chinese preferences as coercion. That framework misses the reality of how small and middle states navigate a world where China has become a central economic and diplomatic actor.
The larger implication is that the One China principle is no longer just a matter of diplomatic communiqués or UN representation. It is increasingly being operationalized through the small administrative details of international life: flight routes, landing rights, transit permissions, event participation, naming conventions, and protocol. For Taiwan, this means that even visits to its remaining diplomatic partners may become harder to execute. For China, it shows how red lines can be extended through the global system without always requiring direct pressure. For the Global South, it is a reminder that autonomy often takes the form of pragmatic risk management inside a world increasingly shaped by great-power rivalry.
China’s power lies precisely in the fact that it does not need to issue public threats every time; many countries already know how to avoid crossing its core red lines.
This episode is useful because it pushes back against the most convenient explanation of the incident.
In international politics, power often works through expectations rather than visible commands. Many states already understand where China’s red lines are on Taiwan. For Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar, allowing the aircraft to pass would bring almost no direct benefit, while creating a non-trivial risk of diplomatic friction with Beijing. Refusing the request was therefore a low-cost, low-risk decision.