Transcript: The Ukrainian Factor in China's Strategy: a Roundtable

The following is a transcript of the Sinica Podcast episode, “The Ukrainian Factor in China's Strategy: a Roundtable,” recorded on February 22, 2024.

Kaiser Kuo: Welcome to the Sinica Podcast, a weekly discussion of current affairs in China. In this program, we’ll look at books, ideas, new research, intellectual currents, and cultural trends that can help us better understand what’s happening in China’s politics, foreign relations, economics, and society. Join me each week for in-depth conversations that shed more light and bring less heat to the way we think and talk about China.

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This week on Sinica, an episode recorded live via Zoom on February 22nd, in which I moderated a panel on China and the war in Ukraine, commemorating the second anniversary of the Russian invasion. I’ll introduce the guests in more depth in what follows, but very quickly, they were Vita Golod, who chairs the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and who convened the session; Bartosz Kowalski of the University of Lodz in Poland; Lü Xiaoyu of Peking University’s School of International Studies, and Klaus Larres of UNC Chapel Hill. Enjoy the show.

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Welcome everyone to this session on the Ukrainian Factor in Chinese Strategy and Online Roundtable convened by the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists. I am Kaiser Kuo, coming to you today from Vienna, Austria. I will serve as moderator of this event. I am the host of the Sinica podcast, which is an independent weekly English-language discussion on current affairs in China. You can subscribe to that podcast wherever you find your podcasts, or listen and read the transcripts, as well as essays and columns at sinica.substack.com, or at patreon.com/sinica. Today, we are taping this roundtable so we can make it available in a few weeks as a podcast. Let me quickly introduce my distinguished guests.

First, a very warm welcome to my friend Vita Golod, who was so instrumental in convening this conversation, and who so graciously invited me to be a part of it. Vita is chairman of the board of the Ukrainian Association of Sinologists, and is currently, I’m delighted to say, a visiting scholar at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill, just up the street from my home in Chapel Hill. Welcome to Sinica, Vita. So wonderful to finally have you on the show after being in our town for a while.

Vita Golod: Thank you so much, Kaiser. We are so lucky to have you moderating this event today.

Kaiser: I am the lucky one. Absolutely. Next, let me introduce Professor Bartosz Kowalski, who is a senior analyst at the Center for Asian Affairs at the University of Lodz in Poland. Thank you, Professor Kowalski, for taking the time to join us and to share your insights and your thoughts.

Bartosz Kowalski: Hello everyone. Thank you for having me here.

Kaiser: We’re also joined by Lü Xiaoyu, who is Assistant Professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University, who is a very well-known scholar of China’s foreign relations. Such an honor and a pleasure to have you here, Professor Lü.

Lü Xiaoyu: Thank you very much. It is my pleasure to be here as well.

Kaiser: Fantastic. And last, by no means least, is my good friend, Klaus Larres, who is distinguished professor of history and international affairs, also at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. But this year, a fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute in D.C. Many of you will know Professor Larres as the man who runs the outstanding Krasno lecture series at UNC. And as many might have noticed, UNC, our Little Town Chapel Hill, is a little overrepresented in this event. I have only to say that our whole region, the Triangle in North Carolina, really does punch above its weight when it comes to international affairs, as in many, many other things.

Today, as we’re all very aware, is February 22nd, here, at least in Austria where I am at the moment. And in just two days, many people around the world will somberly, I think sorrowfully, mark the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All wars must end. The questions that we’re examining today are not directly about the forces fighting the war, but rather about a country that is not directly involved — China. We are going to discuss China’s view on the war — how, or indeed whether at all that view has evolved over the course of the war so far, and how Ukraine factors into China’s broader strategy. We are also going to look at China’s efforts such as they are to mediate and whether they ultimately matter at all. And of course, we’ll look at the impact of the war, and China’s “pro-Russian neutrality,” as some have termed it, how that has affected China’s relations with the EU Specifically.

Before we dive into the deeper questions, let’s start with something that only transpired in just the last few days, and that is Ukrainian foreign minister, Dmytro Kuleba’s meeting with top Chinese diplomat Wang Yi. So, Vita, let me turn to you first. What do we know from the readouts from either side about the meeting, either from the Ukrainian or the Chinese media, or from other news sources?

Vita: Yeah, of course. If I may, first of all, I’d like to express my heartfelt gratitude towards the efforts of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in protecting our people and territory, and also defending Europe in this challenging times. And Ukraine is really heading into the third year of this war with no clear resolution inside. And Ukraine has found itself in a geopolitically complicated situation, caught between the interests and ambitious of multiple superpowers. And not only China, the EU as well as the U.S. currently appears not so united in their approach to Ukraine. And China sees us as a proxy war with the United States, and it was predictable from the very beginning, China would not take Ukrainian side. And China has just adopted its classical pragmatic and cautious approach to this conflict or crisis or issue, weiji, how it called this war.

And we can see a common strategy for China in delicate geopolitical situation, distancing itself from the sensitive questions, not deeply involved itself in negotiation, and pushing the sides to the peaceful resolution. And you just mentioned that Munich Security Conference, and Ukraine votes across almost every discussion. As Timothy Snyder said, Ukraine is fighting the World War. It’s global war, it’s not Ukrainian issue, crisis. And in Munich, we’ve seen wide media coverage, including big Chinese delegation, and also think tankers from China. And as I know, Phoenix conducted the interview with Mr. Kuleba, our Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he said that Ukraine replying to the peace negotiation, possibility of negotiation with Russia and Ukraine. Mr. Kuleba said that Ukraine desires peace more than any other country and strives to restore territorial integrity. So, he met finally with Wang Yi, and it was significant for Ukraine-Chinese relations, because since the start of the full-scale of war, the number of high-level meetings was very limited.

Even Ukrainian politicians and diplomats really work hard to maintain this constant dialogue with China. And this time, Mr. Kuleba invited Chinese side to participate in the Peace Summit in Switzerland. We didn’t get any feedback so far, but we need to gather a broad coalition of countries for peace talks and for discussing our security guarantees, because Ukraine voluntarily gave up all the nuclear weapons many years ago and didn’t get anything in return. So, we need to rebuild our security policy strategy from zero. And from the main stage during the interview, Wang Yi said that, in Munich, that China will play its mediating role when the sides are ready to negotiate, but it’s unlikely so far as long as Putin still has Russian troops on our territory. At the same time, when stressed out that China doesn’t supply little weapons to Russia, and China maintains a stance against the use of LA nuclear weapons.

Kaiser: Right.

Vita: Yeah. And it can serve as a deterrent factor influencing Russia, but it’s only a guess. Ukraine needs security guarantees while we are not in NATO member. That’s a crucial moment for Ukraine. The Chinese constructive role, it’s still a mystery for Ukrainian people. And we need to explain again and again that the world, it’s not just black and white, but when people are dying, it’s not what Ukrainian people want to hear — just beautiful words. And President Zelenskyy and our diplomats still want to see China sitting at the same table with other countries. And when I was asked why in America, the answer could be very simple — Ukraine is trying to keep the balance and to avoid the worst-case scenario. And when you are vulnerable, you just need all kinds of support, especially from the great powers, and you don’t need another enemy. That’s just very simplistic, but it is what it is. And I would stop here, and I would love to listen to my colleagues.

Kaiser: In, of course, the meetings that took place in Switzerland just ahead of the convening of the World Economic Forum, 87 countries, including 15 from Latin America, and Sub-Saharan Africa took part in it. And China was very notably absent. The Chinese delegation and Ukrainian participants in the World Economic Forum, which I happen to be attending, we were both asked very pointedly about Chinese participation. And I don’t know whether there was any progress made on the sidelines at Munich.

Vita: No. We didn’t get any feedback so far. Yeah, so we are waiting and pushing, and really, from our official side, we really want to see China sitting at the same table with other countries, our allies, and to build up these security guarantees. It’s very crucial for Ukraine.

Kaiser: In many recent conversations just before this show, at a seminar that I participated here in Austria in the City of Salzburg, we found that it’s often useful to kind of invert this usual question about what does China want, and ask instead questions about what other PE parties want from China. I know you’ve already talked a little bit about this, about what Kyiv and its backers realistically think they can get from China. I mean, they clearly believe that something can come of all this urging China to take a role in bringing the conflict to a close. So, let me turn to Bartosz Kowalski. What is your sense of what the allies are hoping for from China, and has anything at all, so far that you’ve seen, tangible from this two years of effort, come to your notice? If they’re disappointed in China, how big of a factor is that in terms of the strain that’s been placed on EU-China relations compared to the many other issues, everything from exports of electric vehicles to values issues like Xinjiang?

Bartosz: Thank you. Before I move to this question, I would like to go back to the Munich Conference because when you compare the Chinese narratives from this year with the Munich Conference last year, I can feel that nothing has changed, particularly. China emphasizes that it wants peace talks, it wants peace. However, at the same time, it in directly blames U.S. for waging the war. Wang Yi was asking rhetorical questions in Munich. Who wants really the war in Ukraine to continue? What kind of power does not care about Ukraine lives? And the damages Europe suffers during the war, etc. I believe that it’s kind of game of appearances. China, throughout these two years, has not really made any meaningful step to be seen as a power which wants to change the status quo. I mean, the conflict, the war, which is going on in Ukraine.

Kaiser: And there was an expectation somehow that you held that they would, or is this…?

Bartosz: Well, from my point of view, these expectations which are profound in Europe. For example, in Poland, in Munich, the foreign minister, Sikorski, appealed to Wang Yi to stop the war, to restrict Russia. But these appeals are repeated constantly since the outbreak of the full-scale war in February.

Kaiser: Are they rhetorical? Are they performative? Or are they genuine with an actual real politic expectation that Beijing would take such action?

Bartosz: It’s hard to answer. From my point of view, the only way to restrict Russia’s advancement is to cut down on trade between China and Russia. The Russian supplies to China are key for Russia to withstand Western sanctions. And I’m not talking about little weapons which are not delivered by China, but any kind of supplies that are crucial to Russia’s wartime effort.

Kaiser: So, what then is stopping the EU from sanctioning China then? Why not extend secondary sanctions to China over its continuing trade?

Bartosz: Actually, it is happening. As you probably know, yesterday there was the first round of secondary sections, I mean, on Chinese firms that are conducting trade with Russia. I think that this is what Chinese business is afraid of, that it can be hit by ricochet by this conflict, by this war. And well, I don’t know what will happen next, but we see the change of not only rhetoric, but also in particular, moves on the side of the EU.

Kaiser: Interesting. I want to turn quickly to Klaus Larres, and you can maybe give us your take. You are somebody who has studied a lot of conflicts and the processes that bring them to an end. What inducements can you imagine within the realm of the realistic, again, I mean, that are not performative or merely rhetorical that might see Beijing respond positively, whether those are sticks like secondary sanctions or carrots, positive inducements or something entirely else to get Beijing to do more of what the U.S. and the EU would like it to, and especially Kyiv would like it to? In other words, what could the U.S., Ukraine, and the EU do to persuade Beijing to involve itself more?

Klaus: Thank you, Kaiser, and thanks everyone joining us for this highly interesting, and I think a very important panel because the war in Ukraine is going to drag on and on until someone really takes a decisive initiative. And unfortunately, I think it will not be the Chinese. At the beginning of the conflict, some of us, or many of us, including myself, were really quite hopeful that China would take a meditating role in a constructive way and bring the warring parties together and try to obtain a balanced ceasefire at least. And that has not happened. And I think to reply immediately to your question, I think the main factor here, which could bring that about which could push China into a more constructive mediating role would be Europe because Europe is a big loss the Chinese fear.

Apart from Europe, where tensions have not become better at all in the last few years, apart from Europe the Chinese, as far as I can see, have only obtained advantages from the conflict at the moment. The United States is more distressed than it used to be. It is more distracted by other conflicts around the world, now also by Gaza, of course, and its domestic situation is becoming increasingly polarized and increasingly difficult. That all distracts the United States from focusing too much on Taiwan, on Indo-Pacific, on China as such. And I think that has been recognized because the San Francisco summit, which was quite useful and quite good, I think, has really relaxed relations with China. And I think Biden had no choice because the U.S. seems to be overstretched.

There’s too much going on in international affairs, and now increasingly in domestic affairs for the administration not to try to at least calm down relations with China. Then when you return to Russia, then China has obtained quite advantages from Russia. Russia has clearly become a junior partner to China, much more so than even two years ago. On top of that, the energy situation has been turned into China’s advantage, obtaining more natural resources from Russia at much cheaper prices. And talking about oil, I think that also applies to the Global South where the wind is really moving towards China and towards Russia, and away from the West. And that has an awful lot to do with the Ukraine war. But of course, also now with the recent Gaza conflict. But the disenchantment of the Global South with the United States, and the Western world as such, I think is increasing at dramatic speed, which can only benefit other countries like China.

I think the Chinese, like many global powers, are realists. They look at the world in realistic terms, rather than in humanitarian or human rights or sympathy dimensions. And of course, every individual Chinese leader, every individual Chinese also regrets loss of life and the torture and injuries and destructions. I have no doubt that Wang Yi will, of course, generally, regret that. But from a more global macro point of view, everything is moving towards China. The only exception, as I said at the beginning, is the Europeans. The attention is actually increasing, and I think the Europeans, therefore, would have the possibility to put more pressure on China to be perhaps a little bit more of a mediator in the Ukraine conflict above all economic means. Yeah.

Kaiser: I wonder whether it’s the pressure that could induce them to better participation, more positive, proactive participation. I wanted to save Lü Xiaoyu for last because I think he has a better sense of how Beijing is apt to respond, what sorts of inducements might help from that perspective. I mean, because you talk about this sort of relaxation of tensions after the Xi Jinping and Joe Biden met in Woodside, South of San Francisco. Yes, for sure. And there was a lot of diplomacy over the summer, but the real sore points in the relationship, especially the export controls on quite an expanding list of high-tech goods is, well, the real issue is, and that is also part of the reason why China feels increasingly like it needs to turn to Russia, right? And this is, I think, something that we are not maybe necessarily thinking through. I want to hear about the perspective from China, in so far as you are able Professor Lü, to channel their sentiment. How has that developed over the last two years?

Xiaoyu: Right. I think what I’m going to say is more like my personal assessment and also judgment on the situation.

Kaiser: I understand.

Xiaoyu: First of all, let’s go back to two years ago at the very beginning of the conflict when I think that when China first heard about, learned about the news about the Russian invasion, it was actually accompanied with a big shock. I don’t think the Chinese decision makers fully well noticed and prepared on scale of the military campaign that Russia was going to launch in Ukraine. So, I think that that event looks very much similar to the historical event in 1958. When the mainland tried to take more offensive campaigns on Taiwan, it invited Khrushchev to come over to China, and after the visit, they concluded with this agreement saying that both sides has reached agreement on issues on international relations.

And then a day after Khrushchev left China, the Mainland started bombing Taiwan. And the whole international society saw that this is a mutual agreement acknowledged by Soviet Union. And I think what happened in 2022 is exactly like the reversed relationship of that event with the Winter Beijing Olympics, when everyone thought that by announcing that the limitless partnership, China was well informed and acknowledged Russia’s further actions. But I think the result was exactly the opposite. I don’t think China was well informed about what Russia was going to do. So, it was put into a very kind of awkward position after what had happened. So, this put China in a very kind of passive move, I think, for a whole year from February 2022 to about 2003, 23 February where China wants to see the international responses, and then decided how China was going to act.

So, after that one year, you can see that there’s kind of slow adjustment of China’s policy that’s about this kind of limited involvement in the peace processes, sending out, like the 12-point by China, and then President Xi Jinping had the call with Zelenskyy and appointed a special envoy to visit Ukraine. So, I think that that is what I see, like the gradual changes in terms of the Chinese position with regard to Ukraine. Now, looking back at the point that’s made by the former two speakers, I think that a lot of people got disappointed on China’s mediation efforts saying that China’s not doing enough to deter Russian aggression was based on misunderstanding of China’s impact on Russia.

I think that if Russia was unwilling to notify China about such a big military move that also demonstrate that China actually has little impact or information about what Russia was planning and how Russia was going to coordinate with China. So, I don’t think China, even until today, exercised a key impact on Russia’s top decision-making processes, which means that Russia, like China, can access on the mediation process, especially putting pressure on Russia, what’s expected by many of the European partners is simply unrealistic because this is simply beyond the capacity of China back then and also right now. I think…

Klaus But Chinese have the Chinese tried to do that? And have they found out that it is impossible to get there? Or has there not even been attempted on the basis of your reasoning that it’s no point anywhere?

Xiaoyu: I don’t think that from the previous experience that China had successfully in the past 20 years, I think, so had influence on the decision-making in Russia.

Kaiser: Yeah. So, it’s interesting that you say this because since the outbreak of the war, this has been one of the questions that I’ve been at every opportunity, asking people who might have informed opinions about this or informed actual insider knowledge of this. Now, I can’t, claim to have gotten very, very high up, but I have talked at second-hand to a number of reporters who are well sourced, and there is an emerging consensus that just as you said, this came as quite a surprise and caused a lot of anger and frustration. We saw heads roll, like in the foreign ministry where Russianists were demoted, Europeanist and Americanists sort of raised up in the foreign ministry. I think there was evidence that we can point to that they were really caught quite off guard.

And I have anecdotal evidence that Xi Jinping himself was quite angry. The other point that you make about the… It’s sort of strange to me that anyone would have harbored the expectation. That’s maybe more of my own intuition than anything else, but one person, a few years ago, suggested to me, I think this was even before the outbreak of the war, that there is this sense, and it’s quite widely shared. Most people seem to believe this, that they’re in this strategic condominium between China and Russia. China is the senior partner, Russia, very much the junior partner. And on the face of it, it would appear that way. I mean, in terms of their sheer comprehensive power. But because of Russia’s ability to act so unexpectedly and disruptively, it seems more often to be the case that Russia is leading China around by the nose. Now, this isn’t my idea, this comes from the former acting Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Pacific, Susan Thornton, who made the suggestion on my program. And I am not convinced completely either way right now, but I think we should keep our minds open to the idea that, as Professor Lu suggested, China’s ability to influence Russia is much more constrained than we tend to believe. 

Now, let me stay with you for just a little bit, Lü Xiaoyu. you are probably the best-placed person to give me a sense for how public opinion in China. And I want to ask, actually, Vita also is somebody who observe this, so I would love to hear from both of you on this question. So, I want to ask, first, for Lü Xiaoyu, about sort of the more elite public opinion that is within think tanks, within universities, within the kind of strategic thinking community.

Has the window of allowable discussion shifted? As we probably all know, in the very early days of the outbreak of the war, we tended to see anyone who came out with statements that didn’t follow pretty closely on the official line, to see them censored, to see them buried and not really given any kind of airspace at all. But has that changed? So, starting with Lü Xiaoyu. And then I want to ask Vita, and don’t wait for me, just please jump on in, to talk about sort of broader public opinion and public opinion as being shaped by popular media. So, Xiaoyu first?

Xiaoyu: Yeah. So, Kaiser, if you’re referring to the environment within think tanks within the intellectual community, I would argue actually, since the very beginning of the conflict, since the war, the atmosphere did not change very much. But it is not in a restraining environment, strangely, because when the intellectuals gathered together and discussed, I think that the point of views are being exchanged relatively frankly, without reservation. I think the pressure that the think tanks and also the policy analysts face are maybe found in the public sentiment, which we know is very polarized. So, at least scholars that I personally know who have stood on opposite sides on the wall, their main pressure is neither from the government, nor from their peers, but mainly from the public.

Strangely speaking, I do not think that among the international relations community, there has been this really restraining environment with regard to discussion of the Ukrainian war. I’ve been very frankly and openly stating my opinions since the very beginning, but I don’t think my views have ever been censored. And also, like last year, I personally visited Ukraine for one month and also came back and also participated in many sessions. In none of those occasion that I have, I’ve never been kind of in a way being asked to, in a way, tone down my perspective on the war and what has been going on from my perspective.

Kaiser: I’m sorry, I want to come back to that in a moment. But because you’ve given us a very good opportunity to segue to that source of pressure, of negative pressure that’s shutting down conversations that seems to come from popular opinion. So maybe, Vita, talk about that. And then I do want to come back to you very quickly, Xiaoyu, to ask you  about that trip to Ukraine and the sorts of conversations you had there, and what you sensed about what their expectations were from China. So first, Vita, please, the floor is yours. Vita.

Vita: First, I’d like to say that we don’t have direct like relations with Ukrainian think tank and Chinese think tanks, and we don’t have direct relations and we don’t have chance to opinion exchanges. So, we need to build this direction just to better understand each other and to know how Ukrainians thinks about Chinese position and Chinese’s mediating role. It’s important to say how Ukrainian like ordinary Ukrainian sees China — Chinese mediating role. And I’d like to say that according to Ukraine latest, or Ukrainian opinion poll, more and more Ukrainians consider China as a hostile country. And the latest opinion shows us that 58% of Ukrainians said that China is hostile country. And it was only 34% in July last year. And if we listen to Ukrainian media, they would never say Chinese position is neutral.

Rather, they would say the Chinese position is pro-Russian, and that’s how Ukrainians sees China. And we need Ukrainian voices to be louder in China. And even we try to understand that China has like millions of reason to strategic development, strategic relations with Russia, but it doesn’t help. So, we need a real solution, and we have something in common between so-called Chinese peace plan and the Zelenskyy peace formula that we need to find a common ground to develop this point that is really a strategically important for us. As I say nuclear security guarantee or food security, or we can talk about captured soldiers. It’s also was in Chinese position plan, how to help with humanitarian aid. So, we have a lot in common to discuss, just we need to talk.

And a Ukrainian diplomat and Ukrainian politician is really working hard to establish this dialogue. But as I see from my perspective and also from interview of Ukraine ambassador to China, that Chinese side, it’s not willing to talk and artificially blocked all these dialogues. That’s why we try to build another mechanism of negotiation to ask or attract our alliance, the EU and U.S., to build this platform and, and to talk just in our flavor. So, that’s important to have this dialogue in trilateral form, I think. If China sees us in like proxy war the U.S., okay, we can take it. So, let’s talk like three of us, the U.S., China and Ukraine, or the EU, China, and Ukraine. I think it would be helpful because now as we see, its strategic mistake of China. China is losing European Union in terms of strategic relations in the future.

We really want to talk, and we have something in common between our positions. So, we also invite our partners and alliance to advocate our position to China. And also, I’d like to add about China-Russian’s relations, it’s also important as my insight from discussions from my Chinese colleagues that Xi Jinping doesn’t see any substitute of Putin so far. That’s why he tries to keep, not Russia alive, but Putin alive. So, it’s important because he sees that Russia without Putin would be even worse than now. It would be like chaos by a Chinese border. So that’s like main strategic position of China, why China trying to keep Putin alive.

Kaiser: So, I think we see now plenty of reasons in the selfish interest calling for them not to take a pro-EU, pro-NATO, pro-U.S. position, pro-Kyiv position, and very few inducements, very few reasons to except for moral suasion. I have yet to meet a serious analyst of China who doesn’t see them as a self-interest and reason, and sort of rational actor. And yet I only still have to hear sort of morally grounded and not realism-based arguments. So, I’m wondering why those are missing. Bartosz, do you have any suggest, any ideas why this disconnect? Analyst community that all agrees that China is a self-interested and largely rational actor, and yet a set of inducements that only include sort of enjoining them to do the right thing.

Bartosz: Yeah. So, this is so far so called like sanctimonious diplomacy, right?

Kaiser: Right.

Bartosz: Yesterday, I heard this termed. We like it. This is what Chinese policymakers are because of the Western politicians, right?

Kaiser: Right.

Bartosz: But I would like to go back to the point raised just a while ago, that principally speaking, China’s interested in keeping the status quo because it favors the Chinese economic gains in Russia, be it oil prices, all sorts of economic gains. China wants to find a solution that satisfies the Kremlin, and the only solution that satisfies the Kremlin line is the solution that will keep Vladimir Putin in power, right? So, you cannot, you cannot think of these two things separately. And that said, when you, when you put it in the perspective of what happened in last two years, and when China was making some signs of active involvement into the peace process, I mean, the Zelenskyy-Xi call, one would see that it was also meant to, to some extent, protect the Russian interest.

Why I’m saying that, for example, before Xi-Zelenskyy call, Minister of Defense, Chinese Minister of Defense visited Russia, and it was widely seen, even in Russia as an inspection of the Russian armed forces, whether they’re ready to extend the Ukraine counteroffensive. And for this reason, it was speculated that Xi Jinping agreed to meet, well, call, to have a phone call with President Zelenskyy. Because the idea was that to convince Ukraine maybe to stop the counteroffensive because it could break the advancements of the Russian forces or whatever. If we speculate whether China was surprised with the extent of the Russian invasion into Ukraine, right? In February, we can also wonder that each time Xi Jinping had substantial meeting or call with Mr. Putin, the Russian side escalated the war effort, right?

It’s only a matter of interpretation. I personally do not and don’t really buy the story that China was really surprised with the offensive because in Europe, in the United States, there were repeated warnings that it’s going to happen. And until the very last day of the, well, the first day of invasion, Chinese policing makers were, and the Chinese state media were repeatedly denying these calls that it’s safe. It’s intended to provoke tensions, etc., at Xi, etc. And when it happened, well, the narrative shifted towards amplifying the Russian narratives that it was, let’s say, and wouldn’t say that it’s just war, but the thing is that Russia has its right to wage this war because of NATO expansion, because West didn’t subdue to the Russian demands raised in mid-December 2021, etc. So, well, I think it’s a matter of perspective, but from my perspective, it’s the other way round, as you suggest.

Kaiser: Why then would you think there would be so many people trying to spin Western journalists into believing that China was indeed surprised? There’s some motive then for that. It was obvious, beginning around the time of the Bali meeting in 2022, just by November, that there was an effort on the part of China to change the narrative there. What would China have the gain by convincing the Financial Times and other news organizations that they were in fact caught off guard? I wouldn’t see any upside. It would seem to maybe undermine, leave an opening for a wedge to be driven in. It doesn’t seem like it would be a strategic rationale, but it was clearly a deliberate effort to get that narrative out there. Anyway, we’re getting off topic.

Klaus: I mean, does it really matter whether they were surprised or not? I think…

Kaiser: I think it does. I actually think it does.

Klaus: Yeah, I think to some extent we all knew that something was coming, but a lot of us, including myself, were still surprised that the attack actually happened. We saw the troop buildup, we saw American intelligence warning for many weeks and months, but I think a lot of us couldn’t believe that it would still happen. And maybe it was a little bit like that with China as well. They knew that something was happening, but they perhaps didn’t quite believe that Putin would do it. But I think in the end, it doesn’t really matter because two years later, all sides have adapted to what is happening on the ground, whether you were surprised or startled at the beginning or not, it doesn’t really, with hindsight, doesn’t really matter. I think how we would find out how important China is for Russia is, let’s assume just theoretically if the Chinese stopped being involved at all in the war effort with whatever — no oil purchases, no deliveries of anything — would that bring Russia to its knees, or would Russia be able to continue the war nevertheless?

And I think that is the question we have to answer to find out how important China is actually for Russia. And, of course, I agree with my Polish colleague, it is in the end because we don’t really have all the information available, in the end, it is largely also a matter of interpretation. But what I can guess from the Financial Times and other economic outlets that a Chinese support, certainly economically for China for Russia, is immensely important. And without that support, Russia’s economy, which is not doing that great, though better than expected, would probably be on its knees. And then the war effort, of course, would be affected. So that debate about senior-junior partner, again, is really not a very fruitful debate because in some respects, the Chinese are extremely important for Russia. In some other respects. Putin clearly ignores them and is not lucky or the servant of the Chinese, but I think no one would blame that.

Kaiser: Right. I mean, that was precisely why I was suggesting that it is important, whether they were surprised or not, whether Xi felt betrayed or not because it does say something about the power relationship between China and Russia, which ultimately does matter. And yeah. Okay. So, you're saying it doesn’t matter, but I think that…

Klaus: No, no, sorry. I’m saying it mattered at that time, of course. And whether Xi felt humiliated mattered. But two years later, things have developed a lot, and Xi will have overcome any feeling of betrayal or humiliation because for real political, for rational reasons, I’m sure he doesn’t love Putin. I’m sure he probably hates him, but that is not really important to emphasize, I can see.

Bartosz: The question is of giving economic lifeline, the day after the invasion, China lifted the sanctions on the Russian exports of wheat, which were long expected by Russia. I think this, it says a lot about the importance of Chinese economic assistance to Russia’s.

Kaiser: Yeah, I don’t think anyone is disputing that It has been absolutely important, that it has really softened the impact of sanctions, that it has weakened the effectiveness of sanctions. But maybe Klaus, Bartosz, both of you can talk about this. What’s the evidence for extensive violation of sanctions or for helping Russia to actually evade sanctions? Has Beijing crossed any bright red lines? Do you think that there should be more stick, there should be more punitive action against Beijing for any of its financial dealings with Russia?

Klaus: Personally, if you ask me, I’m not asking for punitive action because I don’t think that would get anywhere. You don’t want to antagonize China further. You want to bring them in and engage. So, even if there were legal reasons, and I really don’t know whether there have been some legal fine lines, which have been not been observed, but I think in the end, it’s the same as the United States. If you put sanction on a superpower, it doesn’t really get you anywhere. You need to persuade the country to engage more and perhaps be more careful in purchasing oil and gas, and things like that whether the sanctions have been violated or not. We know that it does help Russia. Although it is a matter of legality, but it does help Russia. And the same, of course, applies to India and other countries who buy an awful lot of natural gas and other resources from Russia. One needs-

Kaiser: Yeah. Hydrocarbons and carbohydrates.

Klaus: Yeah, one, yeah, yeah. One needs to persuade these countries to perhaps change their minds or wonder whether it will help the geopolitical global situation, rather than putting sanction on them, which I can’t see would help its eyes on the case.

Kaiser: Great. Okay. Let’s leave that there for now, and I don’t think we can make much progress on that question. Let me turn to Professor Lü. Xiaoyu, help us to understand the position that China formally put forward about a year ago. The foreign ministry does not actually describe this thing that we call the 12-point proposal as a proposal. They call it a position. But whatever they were, I think we can broadly agree, they were disappointing to many observers as well as to participants, in part because they seem so generic. Xiaoyu, you explained to me in an earlier conversation about what you believe the real 12-point position intention was and how it fits into sort of broader ideas of Chinese diplomacy.

Xiaoyu: Yeah, sure. I mean, the 12-point, as I explained earlier, I think that is after a whole year of wait and see, what China came up with in responding to the continuation of the Ukrainian war. And I think by doing that, its main intention is to demonstrate that, well, China has some kind of basic norms or kind of positions with regard to the conflict, with the first principle with respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, which means in future, if we imagine the scenario of Ukraine winning the war, China would not have any difficulty of recognizing the 1991 border of Ukraine and saying that we have always been respecting that from the very beginning during the war.

I think that by saying that, that leaves the flexibility for China to adopt a pro-Ukraine post-conflict position in the future while including as many issues concerning all the parties involving conflict with Russia with the global south, with the European Union, basically to meet everyone’s demand, which means it’ll be equally disappointing to everyone as well. But I think that’s the main purpose of that is to give the international community a sign that China is thinking and trying to do something while living enough flexibility for China’s policy changes in future. I think that is the main purpose. But going back to the previous discussion, I don’t think China can do much at this stage even after 12-point, because we know last year, shortly after the peace position, the Chinese foreign policy has been going through this kind of round of reshuffling that has no real ending only until now. Not only that, as I previous argued, that China does not have such an impact as imagined by many of my European counterparts to access on Russia, neither right now, China, with its foreign policy decision-making, is able to make such a big turn in kind of policymaking with all the foreign policies capacity at this moment, with this reshuffling going on. The priorities for China at this moment is foreign policy is about the neighboring security, and the major country related with Russia and also United States. So, I think that considering the current decision makers capacity, this has been in a way on the top list for the Chinese decision makers.

Kaiser: Xiaoyu, you’ve made this point a couple of times now that you don’t believe that they have leverage. But what we’ve heard from Bartosz is that they very much believe that because of the economic dependency, they do exercise leverage. How would you address that counterclaim?

Xiaoyu: Because by translating China’s economic leverage to political influence would in a way transgress China’s long-standing policy of non-intervention in domestic affairs. China can do that if China wants to, but this will trigger such a big turn on transformation in China’s foreign policies. And this will be highly debated, even among those who are sympathetic to the Ukrainian course and who probably want to punish Russia in a way, they would oppose the ideas of translating China’s economic power into political influence. Once you open the gate with Russia, then you can easily argue China should and can translate economic influence in other regions as well. So, this will put China’s foreign policy in such a fundamental change, which I don’t think the Chinese foreign community will try to do and can’t afford anytime soon.

Kaiser: But I mean, somebody might argue back that Chinese foreign policy hasn’t always been shy about using the economic leverage. I mean, for example iron ore, wine, lobster, all sorts of other things, from Australia to punish them over the political transgression of demanding an investigation to COVID origins. I mean, I think maybe it’s only when we’re talking about pure powers, maybe.

Xiaoyu: Yeah. Well, China only use those measures when, in a way, the disputes are about China’s domestic politics. You rarely find any example of China translating economic powers into political influence when they actually involve international affairs and domestic affairs of other countries. The other countries will challenge China’s position on China’s domestic politics — Taiwan, Xinjiang — China can leverage those economic powers. But we really find any example when China’s trying to influence the domestic politics with other countries when it is not directly engaged with China’s domestic politics. I think this will be quite really big step for China in foreign of policy thinking to do that. And I don’t think there’s this environment or consensus either among the intellectual community or among policymakers to make that change anytime soon.

Kaiser: Vita, I want to ask you now, do you think that there is any meaningful overlap between what the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has put forward, the 12 points, and the 10-point proposal that came out of Vladimir Zelenskyy office?

Vita: Yeah, as I said, it’s something in common. I really understand what a classical Chinese diplomacy is, and it was predictable that China would not involve in this conflict and just try to distance itself like a classical Chinese diplomacy policy. But still, we need to find something, what could be in common to discuss. As I said, it could be like humanitarian aid involvement. It’s nothing to do for China. I think it has this experience in other conflicts before. So, another, it’s also important to continue this nuclear security talks. It’s crucial, important for Ukraine. And we are trying, for my perspective, is a top priority of Ukrainian diplomats and politicians to talk about this nuclear security with China as, as well as with U.S. and UK. It should be some protection from the global leaders, from the great powers to secure our nuclear security while we are not a NATO member.

And also common between two clients — Chinese and Ukrainians — it’s food security. We need China to help us to restore our black sea grain initiative. And last summer, our trades representative, Mr. Kachka, he visited Beijing, and he had a constructive talks with his Chinese colleagues. As the result, we just see only one outcome of this visit — Chinese market now it’s open for Ukrainian honey, but it’s not enough. We need a real constructive role for restoring this black sea corridor. Because we see like Ukrainian logistics blocked in all ways, including Polish border. It’s crucial for us because we really rely on Polish, France, and colleagues. And now we need to continue our export on trade. And unfortunately, we lost a big share with our turnover with China, like about 40%.

But China is still interested in trading with us, and also including grain, wheat and barley. And China is still our key trade partner. We would like to continue this dialogue, and we’d like to invite all our alliances and partners to speak with us on the same platform. And also, I’d like to add, not from a European Union perspective, but from American perspective, we know that U.S. and China relations, it’s very, how to say, it’s a consequential relations for all countries. So, we need to understand how the U.S. and China relations with development future. It’s very important for us. And we are watching about these primaries in the US, and it’s not helping us to win this war.

KaiserYeah, that’s a very-

Vita: America, it’s not united.

Kaiser: That’s a very good segue into the exact question that I wanted to ask to Bartosz and to Klaus, which is this — there’s this focus in our conversation and a lot of conversation on China’s role. One of the great gains, I think in the immediate aftermath from the Western point of view was the strategic congruity between the United States and the EU, more broadly, even beyond NATO, right? There was very little space between their views for a while, and that seemed to reverse in its tracks the move towards strategic autonomy of individual EU countries or of the EU as a total. And that was something that China probably was disappointed in, but the threat to that EU unity, EU-American condominium seems to come more, to me, from the United States, and its political uncertainties that it’s facing in the run up to November, then from China. Why isn’t that more prominent in the conversation? Anyone? Bartosz?

Bartosz: Yeah, it’s clear that we are really, well, following the developments in the U.S. and awaiting the outcome of the U.S. elections. There are some worries that one of the first decisions of Donald Trump, if he wins, might be to lift the sanctions on Russia, right? We have to have this scenario in mind, right? Which would profoundly change the economic dynamics, right? Not only between Russia and the West, but also China and the EU, etc. In recent weeks, there is a sense of shifting atmosphere in the EU, at least with what I’m hearing, that we have to be prepared for this worst-case scenario, which would open the space for looking for some sort of compromise with China, right? Including the economic tensions, which are on the rise, as you know. It includes the EVs, it also takes into account wind farms, etc., because we have to bear in mind that couple of years ago, the dynamics between the EU and China was quite an opposite, right?

It was pretty a complimentary relation. Right? Now, it’s quite different because China is really competitive to the EU markets, to the EU producers. So, there is this rising tide of protectionism on both sides, of course, and also in the U.S. And the thing is that, for China, how China understands the EU strategic autonomy is that I think it’s pretty close to how French government understands the strategic autonomy, which means basically to fend off the U.S. influence from Europe, right? In Davos, a couple of weeks ago, President Macron said that for him, the ideal example of striking a good balance between the U.S. and Chinese influences President Vučić, president of Serbia. For me, it’s a sign that if you consider this is an ideal balance, so what does it mean to be dependent on China or U.S., or whatever?

Kaiser: Yeah. Klaus, if you wanted to weigh in there, I’d love that. But then, of course, I want to turn to Xiaoyu and ask about the view on this question from Beijing.

Klaus: Yeah. I think the Biden administration, right from the beginning, tried to recreate Transatlantic unity and achieved that to some extent. But then, of course, Putin invaded in February 2022, and that really pushed the transatlantic allies together. It also pushed the European Union countries together. So, in a way, you can say this would not have happened to the same extent if there had been no war, if Putin had not invaded. Regarding EU, we have only largely two major outliers. That is the, or the EU-NATO now, that is Hungary and the EU, and then Turkey-Hungary also in NATO. So far, the alliance has held. Whether it’ll hold in the future, has an awful lot to do with the length of the wall, with the energy question still to some extent, with the resource question, the financial question. At the moment, because of the threat which is seen by Putin in the geographical proximity of most European countries, that is what is keeping the EU together. 

And I can’t see that it’ll disappear anytime soon. That doesn’t mean it’ll never disappear. I’m not saying that, but for the time being, Russia is still seen as such an aggressor who could well come into Poland or the Baltic states, whether or not that is realistic, at least that is a perception of many in Europe. And that holds both EU and the NATO alliance together. And the big factor of insecurity is, of course, Donald Trump here. And we don’t know what will happen there. If I can just raise one or two points, which my Chinese colleague just said, and maybe I misunderstood it, but I always believe that the Chinese principle of international affairs was to observe sovereignty — the sovereignty and independence of another country.

That clearly has not happened with Ukraine and Russia, but China does not seem to have much criticize that, though one of the major principles of its international relations policies has been clearly undermined and disrupted. And secondly, when you look at what China is doing in the outside world, like many other powers, I’m not saying China is unique here, but it joins in to disinformation campaigns. We know about police stations in the United States, and I’m sure other countries, Russia, even the United States may do that as well, though we may not know about it always, but certainly we know that the Chinese are very actively involved in getting mixed up in the domestic affairs of other countries. I wonder, how does that correspond to what you said that China would always not get involved in the internal affairs of other countries and stick to its foreign international principles.

Kaiser (1:04:34): Xiaoyu, you can answer that if you want, or I can jump in because I think that…

Klaus: I may have misunderstood what he said, you know. A little bit of clarification would help. Yeah.

Kaiser : No, I think you, you have the idea, right? That yes, sovereignty, and there is an obvious sort of disconnect between China’s stated commitment to sovereignty and territorial integrity and its failure to full throatedly condemn what was obviously a violation of those exact principles. I think that Beijing sees its enumeration of those principles each time as a dig at Russia. Whenever it says it, it believes that that is an implicit criticism of what Russia did. It’s not a very satisfying one. It certainly doesn’t count to me as full throated. As for these transnational repressive mechanisms, police stations, next time we have lunch, Klaus, I’ll tell you what the real truth of this.

Klaus: I know. And of course, but it’s a habit of great powers, let’s put it that of all great powers to get involved in the domestic affairs of their opponents and rivals. I don’t think that anyone can deny it. That includes China and Russia and the United States, and probably a lot of European countries as well, whether we know about it or not precisely.

Kaiser: To greater and lesser extents. Anyway, let’s move on. Because there’s still a couple of questions that I think are very, very important to us here, and maybe let me first, though, get Xiaoyu to address what I was asking both of you about strategic autonomy in the EU, Beijing’s perspective on that, whether it believes that the war constituted a big reversal for a major strategic hope that China has nourished for some time.

Xiaoyu: In 2023, after my visit, both in the European Union and also in Ukraine, I found there’s a perception gap about the very idea of autonomy between the EU and also China. I think China very much welcome the idea of strategic autonomy thinking that is referring to the security autonomy from the United States, which means the European Union finally realized that it needed to defend itself, and further discredit the United States as a reliable security partner, especially with the possibility of reelection of Trump. But I think that from the European counterpart, when they discuss about the very idea of autonomy, that’s the three layers of autonomy. Firstly, is about the energy autonomy, which is very clear that they cannot rely on Russia anymore. Security autonomy, before the U.S. election, I think right now there’s still very much a like a unity that Europe need to work very closely with the United States, but even closer probably in comparison to before.

And thirdly, it’s about the, the economic autonomy. And the main concern is about China, whether they can still rely on China or not. I think strategic autonomy for European Union has three layers of meaning, but for the Chinese, it’s mainly focused on the security autonomy. And on that level, the impression which I got last year is that everyone’s waiting. The Ukrainians are waiting for the U.S. election, the Europeans are waiting, the Chinese are also waiting. And they firmly believe that with the reelection of Donald Trump, there will be a push for the security autonomy on the European level, which means that China is probably going to work on its position because in a way that a stronger European Union, military-wise, is not going to do anything harmful to China, but it might further discredit the United States as a reliable regional security partner that will have implications for East Asian countries. Because all East Asian countries will look at the European example and realize that the United States may not fulfill security commitment anymore, and this will probably give China more leverage in organizing the regional or reorganizing the regional security architecture in East Asia. So, I think this is my kind of assessment from the-

Kaiser: Fantastically, very, very, very lucid, very well-articulated answer there. And thank you. There are so many other angles that we might take when thinking about how Ukraine enters into China’s strategic considerations, my sense is they go beyond China’s relations strictly with the EU or the U.S. to include, some might suggest exploiting, I don’t know if that’s the right word, the ambivalence of some nations of the Global South as well as their historical relations with the Soviet Union. I think mainly of countries like India than with Russia to widen those, those nations strategic distance from the us. However, I think our time is a little bit limited. We won’t be able to explore all of this. So, I would love to get this group, same group back together to talk about some of these things another time.

I do, however, want to talk about one issue that I require, I think it requires a little bit of sensitivity to bring up and that is Beijing’s bottom line for what an armistice would… I mean, maybe more to the point, not just Beijing’s bottom line, but Ukraine’s bottom line for what would be acceptable, Russia’s bottom line for what could be acceptable. Agreements are not, in the end, made by different parties simply signing onto high flown principles like the ones that Beijing has repeated, but rather about specific compromises that are very hard to negotiate and are just as difficult to accept. I think we can all empathize, I think everyone listening, everyone here present, with the way the Ukrainians must feel whenever someone suggests blithely that they have to compromise, when it was Russia, after all, who was the clear aggressor, and when, for two years it’s been Russian troops on Ukrainian soil. It’s completely unbalanced.

I’m certain that if I were in the Ukrainian position, I would feel exactly the same and wouldn’t want to hear a word about the sorts of compromises that parties with much less skin in the game, just kind of casually offhandedly suggest. So as difficult as this is, I am going to ask, does anyone have a sense for any starting basis whatsoever for a set of agreements that, I mean, it seems unimportant, whether Beijing could sign onto them, but more importantly, that Ukrainians could eventually accept that Russians might find acceptable, barring a significant shift in the strategic situation on the ground in the disposition and the relative strength of forces, what could be one nugget, which would be a basis for anything like a compromise? I don’t mind who starts. So, anyone who wants to open their mouth first is welcome to. You’re in a safe space, so please. Nobody, see, that’s what I thought. Should I call on you? Vita, yeah.

Vita: Yeah, if I may just say a few words. Ukraine, it’s not ready to discuss any sensitive questions with any kind of alliance or enemies. I don’t know. We are not trying to convince anybody, but it’s very clear that Ukraine is not giving up territories. We are not in this position to discuss territories. So, we’d like to make it clear for Chinese partners, for Chinese, I don’t know, think tanks, we are not willing to discuss these sensitive questions in any platform. And now we really understand that our future relations with China and the EU future relations with China will depend on Chinese behavior on this war. It’s very important to China to step up in any level in any point, and just to show this constructive role of responsible player. As well, the U.S. also need to understand where would be any kind of compromise to talk with China.

And we know very well that the main fraction of the U.S.-China relations, it’s not Ukraine, it’s in the Pacific. So, there are a lot to talk with like both sides, and Ukraine could be a point of compromise between the U.S. and China, which as they start to talk this trilateral format, it’s important to build this platform before the election, before like any consequences of this election. I’d like to stop here.

Kaiser: Interesting. Xiaoyu, what Vita just said, I think we all understand emotionally on that level, but it doesn’t seem to offer much for inducement for China to come up with any meaningful statement. It is like you’re basically saying, “We want you to participate in a peace process entirely on our side and entirely on our terms,” without even touching the possibility of any compromise that could bring the Russians somehow to the table, which ultimately, as little as we want, barring a total Ukrainian victory would be the only way to arrive at a peace process. So, it doesn’t seem to leave China much room for maneuver. Right? Xiaoyu, do you want to address that?

Xiaoyu: Yeah. During my visit in Ukraine, I think all the Ukrainian policy makers deliver that point very explicitly unclear to me, which I believe would be in the same manner when they spoke to the Chinese decision makers. And I think that right now that China realize very clearly that although the international community might have the heart with Ukraine, in terms of the mind, that someone at some point need to say that like the difficult strategic decision need to be made about when to make the negotiation would be the best for Ukraine in future. And China might realize that it is definitely not the best actor to say that at this moment. So, I think that China will still in a way have this kind of wait and see policy after the U.S. election.

I don’t think China will stand up its action at this very moment, realistically speaking. And I think that if we leave China aside, and if we just discuss about Ukraine and Russian negotiation, what I kind of think what might be a possible solution and the potential like a likely scenario is that both sides might enter a frozen conflict at this first stage. And in the internationally mediated agreement, what might happen is that Ukraine got to declare that it still has the territorial rights to the 1991 borders in the agreement. But what happened is that in effect, that the Russia still got the status control of its current control territories at this very moment. And I think both sides will enter, later on, a more kind of a hard discussion and difficult discussion, probably with eruptions, with future conflict to make the border shift.

But I think that entering a frozen conflict with Ukrainian, declaring that the territorial rights to the 1991 border might be a solution that can be pushed both by United States and the European Union at this stage with the uncertainties with the U.S. election. Because at this very moment, I think Ukraine need time, it need time to regroup itself and to be more prepared at this very stage with the uncertainties lying ahead.

Kaiser: Thank you very much. Let me pass on now to Bartosz. Can you weigh in here, and what, do you think? I know these are difficult questions.

Bartosz: Yeah. Well, when it comes to the idea of frozen conflict, accepting the frozen conflict, I remember the information published after the Xi-Zelenskyy call, and I think it was the minister, Kuleba, minister of foreign affairs said that there’s no room for discussion about the frozen conflict. But at the time, probably we are in different situation now, but I feel that I’m not really in the position to, well, to discuss this given the sensitivity of this issue, especially for the Ukraine, our Ukraine colleagues. But my understanding is that at present, Ukraine would not accept these terms, I mean, any kind of frozen conflict, which would in the long run, would act against the security not only of Ukraine, but also the security of Europe in larger terms, right.

Kaiser: Right.

Bartosz: So, then we have to think of who would benefit if this scenario would materialize. And I’m still thinking about, once again, about Russia and China. One more thing which caught my attention after Li Hui’s visit to Europe and Ukraine, European countries in Moscow last year, is that when he returned to Beijing, and there was a press conference. At the very end of the conference, he was asked what was the reason for the Russian military operation in Donbas? And he said that according to my sources, I mean to Russian officials and officers, the reason was to protect the peoples of Donbas. So, I think, I’m not sure to what extent we have to treat such statements as relevant to general policy making in China, but I think it gives us a sense of what is the perception of the Chinese, well, government officials on the conflict.

Kaiser: Thank you. Thank you very much. Last word goes to Klaus Larres on this question.

Klaus: Yeah, thank you. I think I agree here with my colleague from Beijing that that may well be the outcome, unfortunately, some sort of frozen conflict, but we know from Moldova and particularly from Georgia, that that is not a very happy scenario and creates further instability, certainly not more stability. What really is required here is that Putin also makes some compromises. If he wants to start negotiations on the basis — I’m not giving up anything of that 20% of the Ukrainian territory, which I’ve conquered — then no one will even enter negotiations. So, both sides need to at least indicate that they are prepared to compromise in a genuine way, not just rhetorically. Secondly, it still leaves the question open. Can we trust Putin? Even if you arrive at such a solution — 10% here, 10% there, whatever, it’s difficult to fight that now, but can we really trust Putin to stick to it and not to start all over again after six months’ time or use guerilla forces, “Little Green Men” and so on?

And here, I think the international community, including China perhaps, has a role to play. We do need to employ UN police forces UN soldiers, perhaps a little bit like its side thrust, and here that Chinese would, of course, have an important role to play in a constructive, internationalized way. And that is, I think, where a China contribution could really come into it and convince the general assembly, and of course, the security council even more to go down that road. But this trust of Putin and Russia is so high that some sort of international reassurance needs to be employed. Otherwise, any peace negotiations will not even come off the ground.

Vita: Kaiser, I’d like to add one, I forgot to say Xiaoyu was in Ukraine and he had a chance to meet President Zelenskyy. So, it’s very important to see he’s only amongst us who had this chance to visit and meet with President Zelenskyy. And also, I very welcome all think tankers and scholars to come to Ukraine and to understand the situation in Ukraine from inside, and to understand how important to keep this territorial integrity, not only for Ukrainians, but also for our soldiers who are everything in this battle line. So, it would be like an explosion in our society if we start to talk about giving up territories. So, it’s not impossible at the moment. It’s important to know Ukrainian opinion polls for Chinese colleagues.

Kaiser: Xiaoyu, if you are willing to share about your direct encounter with President Zelenskyy, we would be honored.

Xiaoyu: Well, yeah. I mean, it was such an honor for me as well. And during my visit, I had a chance to meet with him and also several of the senior diplomats in Ukraine. And I think the impression which I got, there was such a contrast because when I was in the European Union, I was meeting with the European Union Diplomat, which, of course, they have this very kind of moral language about persuading China to do more. 

And when I was in Ukraine, when I was meeting with President Zelenskyy, I realized they have a very realistic evaluation about China’s position. And it’s very clear to them that I think it came to a point that when they said that we understand that China has a long border with Russia, and China probably cannot openly break up with Russia for its own national security, but we do appreciate what China can do in terms of three issues, which I said firstly, it’s about openly respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

And secondly, it’s about being very clear on the non-use of nuclear weapons. And thirdly, it’s about no selling of lesser weapons to Russia. And I think those three points have been delivered as the red line or baseline for Ukraine. And the Chinese side, for now, I think for my judgment, had followed those recommendations. So, I think those will be the base consensus between China and Ukraine for this time being. Whether it can move forward, I totally agree with Vita that people need to talk more to see which areas can we make minor breakthroughs so that in a way that the Ukrainian voice can be heard much more clearly and also loudly within the Chinese audiences?

Kaiser: Klaus, I had told you how you would get the last word, but as it turns out, we get the last word from President Zelenskyy in a delightful surprise, so I think you’re probably going to be okay with that. On that note, I want to thank all the participants on this fantastic panel, especially Vita Golod, who helped to put it together and who really brought us together for this. My great gratitude for organizing this. I look forward to, to seeing you once time back in Chapel Hill. To Bartosz Kowalski, who had fantastic insights for us from the central European perspective, looking both at Ukraine and at the EU. And, of course, to Lü Xiaoyu, who brought, I think, some incredibly lucid perspectives from Beijing. Not only giving us the Chinese perspective, but also, I think helping to break open this idea that there’s some sort of monolithic support among the Chinese strategic class for Putin in this. And finally, to my friend Klaus Larres, who I look also forward to seeing once I’m back stateside. And I’ll set you straight on that whole police…

Klaus: And thank you and thank you to Kaiser for moderating the event so successfully and so well, and so balanced.

Kaiser: Looking forward to seeing everyone. Thank you once again. I will get this program edited and get it out on the podcast, and I’ll try to make that a priority. So, thank you everyone who was listening online and really appreciate it. I see some very kind reactions coming up.

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You’ve been listening to the Sinica Podcast. The show is produced, recorded, engineered, edited, and mastered by me, Kaiser Kuo. Support the show through Substack at sinica.substack.com, where there’s a growing offering of terrific original China-related writing and audio, or email me at sincapod@gmail.com if you have ideas on how you can help out. And don’t forget to leave a review on Apple Podcasts. Enormous gratitude to the University of Wisconsin Madison’s Center for East Asian Studies for supporting the show this year. Thanks for listening, and we’ll see you next week. Take care.