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Trivium China Podcast | China’s One-trick Pony Economy
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Trivium China Podcast | China’s One-trick Pony Economy

China’s October data was grim across the board. And it came barely a month after Beijing rolled out a fresh support package in late September.

  • By our estimates, fixed-asset investment fell almost 17% y/y – the sharpest monthly drop on record. Retail sales grew just 0.4%. Domestic auto sales fell more than 20%, their eleventh straight month of double-digit declines. Exports, meanwhile, rose 35%.

Beneath the headlines, nearly all of the economy’s momentum now comes from one narrow slice of it – computers, AI and electronics – where output grew almost 20%, against about 3% for the rest of manufacturing.

  • With export growth likely to moderate in 2027, how long can one sector carry everything else?

On this episode, Dinny McMahon, Trivium’s Head of Markets Research, fills in for regular host Andrew Polk. He sits down with Joe Peissel, Trivium’s Lead Macroeconomist, to unpack:

  • Why AI is propping up China’s economy differently than America’s

  • Why September’s stimulus money is sitting idle

  • How the auto slump became a manufacturing problem

  • Why Beijing is unlikely to add support before March

Give it a listen – and read Joe’s macro wrap while you’re at it.

Transcript

Dinny McMahon: Welcome to the latest Trivium China Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I am your host, Head of China Markets Research, Dinny McMahon, filling in for Andrew Polk, who I believe is catching up on the Netflix series he’s missed this year. And today I’m joined by Joe Peissel, Trivium’s Lead Macro Economist. Joe, how are you going?

Joe Peissel: I’m good. Thanks, Dinny. Happy to be here.

Dinny: Brilliant. Well, we’ve got Joe on the show today to discuss the China macroeconomic data for October. Spoiler alert: it is pretty bleak. Now we’ll get into the details of all that in a bit, but before we do, we need to do the customary vibe check. Joe, how’s your vibe?

Joe: My vibe’s good, Denis. I’m looking forward to a week of annual leave next week. The U.S. team are off for Thanksgiving holidays. I’m a Brit, so I don’t celebrate Thanksgiving. If anything, I mourn it, but I’m also on annual leave. So, I’m very much looking forward to spending time with my friends and family next week. Yeah.

Dinny: I’ve got to say it took me a little bit to get into Thanksgiving when I first moved to the States, but now I love it. I’m a convert. And because of that, my vibe, I’m sort of in a bit of a betwixt and between state at the moment that you kind of get at the end of the year when things are starting to wind down, first with Thanksgiving next week, and then the Christmas holidays for the kids just a few weeks away after that. And yet at the same time, there’s this sort of mountain of stuff that needs to get done between that now and the end of the year.

So my vibe is I’m very much enjoying the onset of the holiday season, but just wish I could lean a little bit more heavily into the festivity side of things. But anyway, before we get into the content, we also have to do the quick housekeeping up top. So a quick reminder: we are not just a podcast here. Trivium China is a strategic advisory firm that helps businesses and investors navigate the China policy landscape.

That, of course, includes domestic policy in China, but it also includes policy towards China out of foreign capitals like D.C., London, Brussels, and others. So if you need any help on that front, please reach out to us at hq@triviumchina.com. We’d love to have a conversation about how we can support your business or your fund. Or if you just have comments on the pod, reach out to us. We always love to hear feedback from our listeners.

And then, finally, please do tell your friends and colleagues about Trivium, both about the business and about the podcast. It really helps us grow the company, and we truly appreciate the word-of-mouth recommendations. And while you’re at it, please leave us a rating on your favorite podcast platform. So with that out of the way, let’s get into it. Joe, are you ready?

Joe: Yeah, I’m ready, Denis.

Dinny: Brilliant. Well, as I foreshadowed at the top, China’s most recent economic data was, for the most part, pretty miserable. Which at this point is starting to feel a little bit like business as usual. Nonetheless, there were some interesting numbers that jumped out at us, which we’ll get into in a bit. But to start with, Joe, just give us the headlines. Can you talk us through the key October data points for the good people listening at home?

Joe: Yeah. October was, as you said, a pretty grim month for China’s economy. I think what the biggest disappointment was probably investment, which fell by almost 17% year-on-year fixed asset investment. Just as a side note, the Stats Bureau publishes growth for fixed asset investment, which looks at year-to-date. So that’d be January to October. But we use that data to infer and estimate monthly growth rates. So, by our estimates, fixed asset investment declined almost 70% year on year. And again, by our estimates, that’s the sharpest monthly decline on record ever.

So a really miserable month for China’s fixed asset investment. Consumption was also very weak. Retail sales of consumer goods edged up just 0.4%. Growth in service retail sales also slowed sharply. So pretty grim. There was, I think, one clear bright spot, which was exports, which continue to grow strongly. Same old there. They were up 35% year-on-year in October. Although we might discuss later, there’s a bit more to that story than the headline numbers suggest.

So overall, as I say, pretty disappointing set of numbers, particularly given that Beijing had just rolled out in late September a package of support measures, which didn’t seem to have much of an effect.

Dinny: So, in the note that you wrote about all this stuff, you described China’s economy as being a one trick pony. Can you explain a bit what you meant by that?

Joe: What I mean is that if you look beneath China’s headline growth figures, then we see that a huge proportion of economic momentum is coming from a relatively narrow part of China’s economy. And it’s a subsector which the Stats Bureau classifies as computers, AI, and electronics. So this covers things like semiconductors, computers, laptops, servers, all the kind of hardware, hard drives, graphic cards, all that sort of stuff. It’s a big bucket of things, but it’s a very narrow subset of all manufacturing activity.

What’s striking, particularly about October, is the divergence between this subsector and the rest of China’s manufacturing base. So manufacturing output in this area grew by almost 20% year on year in October. But if you exclude that, exclude these AI and computer-related components, then the rest of China’s manufacturing base only grew by about 3%. So tiny, tiny growth outside of this one subsector.

And we’re seeing exactly the same pattern in investment as well. So this subsector, computers, AI and electronics, the only subsector that attracted positive investment throughout October. Investment into this subsector grew by about 13%. Excluding this area, manufacturing investment as a whole actually contracted by 12%. Again, these are also our estimates. The MBS doesn’t publish this data. These are in-house estimates that we calculate. And this illustrates the extent of the divergence really well. And we see the same concentration on the export side as well. Of China’s strong export growth, more than a fifth of this was driven by semiconductor chips alone. So when I say a one trick pony, what I mean is that there’s a small sliver of economic activity, which is carrying the weight of China’s entire economy.

Dinny: Well, that’s wild because it’s funny. When people talk about the U.S. economy at the moment, the big concern is that the U.S. economy is being driven almost exclusively by the build out of AI infrastructure and data centers and all the supporting energy facilities that have to go with it. But when you kind of look at China, there’s that same sort of build-out; that same sort of scale investment isn’t happening for a bunch of reasons. Yes, China’s investing in compute. Yes, Beijing has made it a priority. It’s one of the six networks of infrastructure investment that we’ve talked about before. But there’s less need to sort of engage in the energy build out we’re seeing in the U.S., largely because China’s invested in so much renewable capacity the past few years, the issue is less about building it and more about ensuring the grid can support it.

And so there’s kind of been this like, well, why isn’t AI sort of having the same impact on the Chinese economy as it is on the U.S. economy? And yet what you just described then is that, in fact, it is. The AI build out is having this disproportionately large impact on the Chinese economy. It’s just affecting it in a very, very different way. It’s less about the build-out of the infrastructure domestically, and it’s more about the needs of a global economy. Is that a fair observation, Joe?

Joe: Yeah, I think so, Dinny. It’s having the same or a similar impact, but smaller scale. The reason the rest of China’s economy looks so unfavorable, maybe I should say the reason China’s economy looks so weighted towards AI, despite this smaller scale of build-out than the U.S., is because the rest of China’s economy is performing so terribly. So, consumption is in the doldrums, as I mentioned earlier, other parts of manufacturing. The growth is slowing. Some areas of manufacturing are now shrinking. China’s got really tricky inflationary dynamics at the moment with high upstream inflation and low downstream inflation.

And so because the rest of the economy is doing so badly, by default, that makes the role of the AI build-out disproportionately large, even if in absolute terms, it is a smaller scale than what we’re seeing in the U.S.

Dinny: Yeah, I think that’s a really good distinction. Moving on from AI for a moment. I mean, the biggest surprise for me from the October data was just how weak investment was. Now, we’ve come to expect that to a certain degree from the property sector, which just seems to be going from bad to worst, which five years into a property correction/collapse/crisis. I mean, it’s amazing to think that the contraction of investment from month to month, it continues to be as aggressive as it is.

But also given the weakness of domestic demand and what you said about the economy being a one-trick pony, the weakness in manufacturing investment doesn’t really come as a huge surprise either. But infrastructure investment, Beijing rolled out this sort of mini stimulus package in September, which I would have expected that to give infrastructure investment a bit of a boost by now, but clearly it hasn’t. So what’s going on?

Joe: Yeah. Before we get into why infrastructure investments are weak, it’s probably worth just briefly reminding ourselves what Beijing actually did in September, what this policy support package was. So there were four parts to the package, but only really two that are directly relevant for infrastructure. So the first was an additional quota of local government special purpose bonds. So 550 billion RMB in extra local government spending for infrastructure projects.

And the second part of this package, which supports infrastructure, was cheaper funding for policy banks. And this was through a reduction in the interest rate that the PBOC charges when lending through its pledged supplementary lending facilities, PSL, which is a channel-

Dinny: It really rolls off the tongue, doesn’t it?

Joe: Yeah, exactly. Really well worded. Which is a channel to provide policy banks with cheap funding. So, there’s these two parts of the late September support measures, which were kind of directly meant to boost infrastructure spending. And then separately, but also very importantly, policy banks have deployed 800 billion RMB in seed capital across September and October. That was technically part of the September stimulus package, but it’s also a huge stimulus for infrastructure.

It provides upfront equity financing for infrastructure projects to get them off the ground. So kind of putting it all together, Beijing’s provided a lot of funding, made a lot of funding available. But there are questions about how effectively that funding is actually translating into actual investment. So, if we first consider the PSL facility, the central bank cut the interest rate on the PSL lending to 1.5%. So, the intention is central bank provides cheap funding to policy banks, and then they can use this to finance an infrastructure build-out.

The problem is that that interest rate, 1.5%, is actually more expensive than policy banks could currently borrow by issuing bonds. And so they have no incentive to draw down on the facility. You see this in the data. The outstanding PSL balance was unchanged at the end of October relative to the end of September. So it wasn’t used last month. And that means that one of the key financing channels in the September measures isn’t being used. So of course, that blunts or negates its stimulatory impact.

Then if we look at the other part of the support package, which was this increase in local government special purpose bonds, well, local governments issued a lot more special purpose bonds across September and October this year than they did last year, almost twice as much. So, the growth in SPB issuance is up almost 100% year on year. But there’s evidence that this money isn’t actually reaching infrastructure projects. And here I should give a shout out to our colleague Wenye Sun, who did this research. I don’t want to take credit for it. Well, I would like to take credit for it, but Wenye won’t let me, and rightly so. So fiscal deposits is essentially money sitting in government bank accounts. We can think of it that way.

That has surged throughout October. It’s nearly twice the increase that we saw in October last year. So we see an almost doubling in issuance of SPBs. We also see an almost doubling in the pace of increase of these fiscal deposits. And what that suggests is that there’s a huge disconnect between the amount of money being raised through SPB financing and the money that’s actually being spent. Instead, it’s being stored in these fiscal deposits. It’s not being utilized. And I think there are a couple of explanations for why that is.

Why is it that local governments are issuing a raise in these funds, but then not deploying the capital? And I think the first reason is that local governments are struggling to find viable infrastructure projects. So we know that Beijing has become much stricter about the types of projects that can receive government funding. There’s these much more stringent fiscal sustainability rules. And it’s likely that local authorities simply don’t have enough projects that meet these requirements to spend their SPBs on. The second point, and again, shout out to Wenye for this, is political.

So roughly half of China’s provinces are undergoing leadership reshuffles. And this is ahead of the Party Congress next year, right? The 2027 Party Congress. And of course, this can disrupt decision-making or delay approvals for major infrastructure projects because local officials either don’t have the bandwidth or the authority, or they may just be reluctant to sign off on big spending commitments while these leadership transitions are taking place. And I guess as well as that, there’s also a more straightforward issue of timing that even if these funds are available, even if they are utilized, it’s going to take time for that money to translate into actual construction activity.

So put that all together and I think all these different factors just really undermine the stimulus package that Beijing was hoping would give a boost to infrastructure spending. I think the key question now is, can the central government persuade local governments to accelerate deployment of this funding and actually use it to boost infrastructure spending?

Dinny: Yeah, no, that’s fascinating stuff. I mean, just thinking about it, I think there might actually be an additional reason for why those deposits are sort of ramping up as well, which kind of feed into what you were saying. This is what, I think maybe the fourth year in a row that Beijing has rolled out additional stimulus in October. So on one level, you could almost set your clock by it. And a few months ago, we thought it was inevitable. We saw the economy slowing.

We’re like, “Oh, we’re going to get another October surprise.” But in previous years, Beijing has made the decision that it is going to roll out additional stimulus relatively early and has signaled it to local governments, and effectively have told them, you need to clear the decks now. All your existing local government debt quota, your bond quota, has to be issued mostly by the end of August, entirely by the end of September. So, it’s signaled to local governments early and puts pressure on them to issue their existing stock of bonds. And it didn’t do it this year. And so, as I said, we originally thought that it was inevitable there would be an additional stimulus towards the end of the year.

And then we changed our mind because Beijing wasn’t signaling it was going to do it. There was no pressure on the local governments to issue. And then all of a sudden, at the end of September, it dropped this new $550 billion quota. So, I think an additional issue here is that, firstly, the local governments weren’t prepared for it. And then on top of that, so all of a sudden, they have all this extra money that they’ve got to deploy. They were already finding it difficult to find effective ways or financially viable projects to invest it in. And on top of that, you’ve kind of got the political season.

It’s just kind of been this perfect storm, which is making life really difficult for them to sort of deploy this money. And yet this quota is for 2026. And so the bonds have to be issued this year. And so they’re kind of in this situation where they’ve got the money, they’re not prepared to deploy it, and they’re finding it increasingly difficult to find useful ways to put it. But anyway, look, I think it’s worth moving on to the next issue here, because as you pointed out, this was miserable data all around. It wasn’t just infrastructure. It wasn’t just manufacturing output. It was retail as well, retail spending. And last month, you rightly flagged that the pickup in retail spending that we saw, it was weak, but it was an improvement.

But you flagged that this was going to be a flash in the pan. And as it turns out, the October data was significantly worse. But in some ways, I mean, it almost feels like this is just business as usual at this point: bad month-to-month retail spending data. That said, you had some really interesting things to say about the implications of one particular aspect of household spending, and that was weak auto sales data. So, can you talk us through what you’re seeing on that front?

Joe: Sure. I think what’s interesting about the auto data is that it’s no longer just a story about weak consumer spending, which it has been up till now, but it’s increasingly becoming a problem for China’s manufacturing sector as well. So, auto sales, domestic auto sales fell over 20% in October. That’s the 11th consecutive month of double-digit declines. But what’s concerning is that this is now feeding through into production. So, auto manufacturing grew just 0.9% in October, less than 1% growth in October. That’s the weakest reading in auto manufacturing output since 2022.

So, weakest reading in four years. And that’s especially striking because September and October are normally peak production months because manufacturers ramp up output to hit end of year sales targets. We see that empirically in the data. So what’s going on? Well, the problem is that a lot of automakers are now going to miss their sales targets. And so they’re going to find themselves with excess capacity, unsold infantry. And so the obvious response to this is to cut production. And that’s what we saw in October.

Now, the reason it’s such a big deal in the auto sector is because the automotive of industry has this enormous domestic supply chain. So everything from batteries, electronics, steel, other components. So, if manufacturers are cutting production of autos, that feeds through to weaker demand for suppliers, which in turn affects their manufacturing, investment, and hiring decisions. And so I think there’s a risk that what started as a consumer spending problem, what we’ve tracked throughout the year and really categorized as a consumer spending problem, has now become, or is in the process of becoming, another source of weakness for manufacturing and investment. And that’s why the auto story itself, that’s why I highlighted it in the macro rap, because I think it’s especially significant for that reason.

Dinny: That’s fascinating. I mean, we had Cosimo, our colleague Cosimo on the podcast last week, talking about Beijing’s new approach to dealing with involution. And those efforts are aimed squarely at the auto sector, sort of forcing auto companies to raise their prices to properly reflect costs, forcing auto companies to pay their suppliers in full, on time, in cash, significantly reducing the time that accounts payable get paid. And the thing is, I mean, you look at that drive to sort of get automakers to pay their bills and to price their cars so that they fully reflect the costs in this environment where demand is so weak.

I mean, this is the first time really since Beijing kicked off the anti-involution/overcapacity drive two years ago, where conceivably we might really see some real progress in dealing with the overcapacity issue. Because I think if they are serious about pulling the auto sector into line at a time of declining demand, it’s almost inconceivable that the number of auto companies, which number in the dozens upon dozens, that that many car companies can sort of endure both the market pressures plus what Beijing is imposing on them. So I think that’s going to be a really interesting space to watch over the coming months to see just how severely it bites.

Joe: Yeah, I mean, they’re being squeezed on both sides now, right? There’s the weak demand, and now they’re being squeezed on the other side by this anti-involution push. And I think, as you correctly said, this looks like a real genuine opportunity for the anti-involution push to work. And I think it’s significant for us to track because, as you and Cosimo have said previously, if it’s successful in the auto industry, then it provides a blueprint for how regulators are going to approach involution in other sectors as well.

Dinny: Yeah, absolutely. Now, the interesting thing about auto is that exports have been the saving grace for quite some time now. But as you noted, it’s not just auto exports. I mean, really, exports, broadly speaking, are the one thing that’s really keeping the Chinese economy humming. So, the question here is, given investment is so weak and is not showing signs of improving, given household demand continues to be so weak, and given that it’s really exports alone and a particular subset of exports that’s really the saving grace of the Chinese economy at the moment, are we worried about demand for Chinese products globally collapsing? Does Beijing need to start preparing for a slowdown in the global AI build out or geopolitical tensions hitting China’s trade machine or even something else? What are your thoughts?

Joe: I think short-term, no, is the answer to that. Exports are going to remain this really important source of support for China’s economy in the near term. I think what works for China’s advantage is that Chinese manufacturers are so deeply embedded in the global, not just AI, but the electronic supply chain. And so they’re really well positioned to capture demand for all this hardware, this underpinning, this kind of AI infrastructure build-out to Chinese exporters benefit. And this benefit will continue over the short to medium term.

But I would be cautious about extrapolating this year’s growth rates into next year. And I expect export growth in 2027 to be positive, but to moderate. And there are a couple of reasons behind this. So I think first, at some point, the AI investment cycle is going to mature. And certainly, this doesn’t mean investments are going to collapse into AI hardware. But we also can’t assume that this extraordinary pace of expansion we’ve seen this year is going to continue indefinitely. And then there’s also the question of pricing.

So part of the boom to Chinese exports is driven by price, especially the price of memory chips, while a bunch of other hardware as well has gone through the roof. But as supply expands to try and meet this demand, it means that shortages ease and there’ll probably at some point be a little bit downward pressure on the inputs that go into the AI hardware build out. And then I think the third thing to consider when we’re looking at 2027 export growth is base effects. So China’s export performance this year has been so strong that just to match the value of exports this year, let alone beat them, is going to be difficult.

And I guess the fourth factor, actually, I know I started with two, but I think another thing we have to talk about is trade tensions. So China’s surplus this year, I think it’s already exceeded $1 trillion and is going to grow over the next couple of months. So this intensifies pressure on China’s big trading partners to take action against what they undoubtedly see as growing trade imbalances. So, putting all these pieces together, there are a lot of headwinds against exports next year. So yeah, I expect exports to continue to be this major source of growth, but I do think pace of expansion is going to moderate. And I guess there’s going to be more uncertainty around the outlook as well.

Dinny: Yeah, that’s a really good point. I mean, when you’re looking at the pace of growth over the last few months, I mean, exports expanded by more than 30%. Is that right, Joe?

Joe: Yeah, 35%. Yeah.

Dinny: Which is just mind-blowing for an economy the size of China. It’s been an export powerhouse for what, 30 years at this point. For it to continue to be able to expand its exports at that pace is absolutely mind-blowing. The world’s second biggest economy. But it’s a fair point to make. When exports expand 35%, that won’t be the annual pace of expansion, but when it expands in September by 35%, you can’t expect that in September, October next year, it’ll expand by another 35%.

If it expands by 15%, that would still be an incredible expansion. But the implications for Chinese growth mean that even though it’s a huge expansion, it means exports aren’t going to be contributing to growth as much as they did this year, which then, of course, puts more pressure on Beijing to finally do something about household spending or revive investment. And so, yeah, it’s a really good observation, Joe, that even if exports remain robust, but just less robust than we’ve seen this year, the potential for the Chinese economy to maintain the sorts of levels of growth Beijing insists upon will mean that Beijing really has to get serious about fixing some of the other parts of the economy.

Joe: Yeah, for sure. I agree. I think if I were to try and push back, the one thing I’d say is that we’ve been saying this for years. China’s exports continue to surpass all expectations. I’m kind of speculating here, but if China can crack a new technology, for example, ultra-efficient solar panels, or if it cracks new battery technology, solid-state batteries, something like this, then it creates this whole new growth market. And then we’re going to see a surge in growth, just like we see in this year with semiconductor chips and last year with electric vehicles and the year before that with batteries and the year before the solar panels. So, I mean, don’t count against Chinese exporters by hook or by crook finding a way to continue to eek out growth.

Dinny: And it’s also probably worth noting as well that they’ve posted this incredible growth this year, even as the renminbi has appreciated quite aggressively, if the renminbi stops rising or, God forbid, it starts falling, I mean, that opens up space for exporters to sort of continue to work their magic as well. So the point is very well taken, Joe. But look, I’ve got one last question for you to sort of close out this podcast. And that is in March, we’re going to get the budget for 2027 and a list of all Beijing’s spending priorities.

Between now and then, should we be expecting more of the same from China’s economy? Is pretty much everything on hold until the political season, the sitting of the legislature, and all these key policy documents, everything on hold until that happens in March? Or should we expect additional support or creative policymaking between now and then?

Joe: Broadly speaking, I’d expect more of the same. I think we are seeing growing concern within the leadership about the state of the economy. This month, we’ve seen comments from Xi Jinping and Li Qiang expressing concern about China’s economy. But I think what’s more notable in these comments, in these expressions of concern, is that no one’s announcing more money or major policy measures. Instead, the message seems to be that local governments need to make better use of the support that’s already available, of the funds that are already available.

And that’s very revealing. That tells us where the leadership’s priorities lie. So the immediate focus, just getting the economy across the line, hit the growth target, rather than any fundamental change in their stimulus approach. Now, I think before March, the next important milestone would be the Central Economic Work Conference next month in mid-December. So that’s the annual meeting of China’s senior leadership, where they kind of set out broad economic priorities for the following year.

So, it’s worth watching because we’ll get an indication of how the leadership intends to approach the economy in 2027. But the details, generally, are very high-level. So I think in March, we’ll get the Two Sessions, the Government’s Work Report, the budget, and that’s when we get a much clearer picture of the growth target and the fiscal resources that Beijing’s going to commit. So, yeah, I think the next few months are likely to be relatively quiet in terms of any new stimulus push. But December is going to be important to watch for clues about the direction of economic policy in 2027.

Dinny: Yeah, that sounds about right to me as well. I mean, from experience, when Beijing rolls out a stimulus package, regardless of how big it is, it likes to sit back for a little while and watch what exactly the impact of that package is. And clearly, the measures they rolled out in September haven’t started to really take effect yet. I mean, as you pointed out, so much of the money that they’ve raised from the issuance of local government bonds are just sort of sitting there in bank accounts at the moment. So, it’s only once those funds start to get deployed, it’s only once the policy banks really start issuing bonds and sort of sprinkling that money around the economy, will we see the impact of the various measures that Beijing put out in September.

And it usually takes months for Beijing to firstly assess the success or relative failure of those policies and then come up with a new approach for, if it’s required, coming up for a new approach to sort of push things further forward. And I don’t think we’re in a position for Beijing to make decisions one way or the other until the new year. And then, of course, once you get to the new year, then you have Chinese New Year holiday in February. Making policy decisions in January aren’t going to feed through to the economy until everyone’s back from holidays until the end of Chinese New Year. So, yeah, I mean, it’s really the way things are going at the moment. It’s unlikely to really see any sort of meaningful decisions until when the legislature sits in March.

Joe: Yeah, it seems like the delayed effect of this September stimulus plus strong export growth is enough to get the economy over the line for its growth target. And I think that’s sufficient for policymakers over the next few months.

Dinny: Yeah, no, absolutely. Well, Joe, thanks for talking us through all this. We’ll look forward to having you back in a month’s time to talk about the November data, see if there’s been any meaningful changes. But for everybody else, we’ll see you next time. And thanks very much for joining us.

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