It’s been a while between trips, but last week Trivium’s Head of Markets Research, Dinny McMahon, was back in Beijing.
In this podcast, he and Trivium Co-founder Andrew Polk discuss Dinny’s observations and takeaways from the trip.
After dissecting the vibe on the street, the gents get into:
Where there might be some potential for investment growth this year
Why the only thing that will unlock household spending is a housing market recovery
This one is short and sweet, so please enjoy this fun-sized pod.
And a note to listeners:
The pod will be off for the Lunar New Year next week.
But we’ll be back in your feeds after the holiday with some exciting new content, so stay tuned!
Transcript:
Andrew Polk: Hi, everybody, and welcome to the latest edition of the Trivium China Podcast, a proud member of the Sinica Podcast Network. I’m your host, Trivium Co-Founder, Andrew Polk, and I’m joined today by Trivium’s Head of China Markets Research, Dinny McMahon. Dinny, how are you doing, man? It’s good to have you back on.
Dinny McMahon: Great as always, mate. Good to see.
Andrew: Yeah. We are going to talk about today some more macro themes, but specifically we’re going to talk about them from the lens of Dinny’s recent trip to Beijing. So, Dinny was in Beijing last week doing a workshop for some folks on China’s economic rebalancing. There were sort of Western and Chinese academics and analysts there, and so had a really robust discussion. And then, of course, had a bunch of other meetings around that. So, from the economic rebalancing discussion, I wanted to pull out some of Dinny’s observation, of course, that was all Chatham House rules. So, he’ll kind of just talk about the interesting things that came up without attributing anything.
And then also other sort of observation from meetings around town, which included clients, journalists, government officials, all of the above, to kind of get a vibe check of what’s going on, on the ground. And speaking of vibe checks, Dinny, got to start with our customary vibe check. How’s your vibe, man?
Dinny: Who came up with this bloody idea anyway? Vibe check. Mate, I’m still buzzing from the trip. I don’t get back to China anywhere near as often as I’d like to. Just being back in Beijing for, I mean, it was four full days, it was great. I mean, just catching up with familiar faces, wandering around the old neighborhoods. It was really great. So yeah, I’m still caught off the trip. Or maybe that’s just the jet lag.
Andrew: Yeah. Good to hear, man. Well, I’m glad to have you back. And I’m also excited because I’m going to be heading to Beijing on my own trip in sort of late March. So I’m excited about that. Excited to see colleagues and touch base with all sorts of people from our past lives there. For those of you who don’t know, listeners who don’t know, Dinny and I both lived in Beijing. I lived there for 10 years. Dinny, how long were you in Beijing? You were in Shanghai for a long time and then Beijing. What was the total?
Dinny: Yeah, so working career, it was four years in Shanghai followed by six in Beijing. But in the land before time, I was also a student in Beijing. So, you add it all up and it’s close to seven, seven and a half years.
Andrew: Wow. Well, we’re going to talk about your trip and some of the observations that we can take away from it as listeners to really hopefully get some insights into what’s happening from a macro standpoint in China’s economy. But of course, before that, we have to do some quick housekeeping. First, a quick reminder, we’re not just a podcast here. Trivium China is a strategic advisory firm that helps businesses and investors navigate the China policy landscape. That, of course, includes domestic policy in China across a range of areas, as well as policy towards China out of Western capitals like D.C., London, Brussels, and others.
So, if you need any help on that front, please reach out to us at hq@triviumchina.com. We’d love to have a conversation about how we can support your business or your fund. Otherwise, if you’re interested in receiving more Trivium content, check out our website, again, triviumchina.com, where we have a bunch of different subscription options in terms of China policy intelligence and China policy monitoring. We’ve got tech policy, markets policy, which Dinny oversees. We’ve got general China watcher for business executives and academics and folks who need to stay up on the day-to-day on kind of generally what’s happening in the Chinese policy space. So, check that out. You’ll definitely find the China policy intel option you need on our site. And finally, please tell your friends and colleagues about Trivium and about the podcast. Help us grow our listenership and grow our business. We’d really appreciate it. All right, with that, Dinny, why don’t you just give the people a gut check?
I think a lot of people listening probably have lived in Beijing, some live in Beijing, China generally. Well, we have a bunch of listeners who haven’t been, maybe ever, and who probably don’t go regularly. So, just kind of initial takeaways from being there on the ground over the past few days.
Dinny: Yeah, I think one of the best observations I heard was from an old colleague of mine at the Wall Street Journal. He left for a bit and came back, and he said the thing that got him when he came back is that Beijing more or less looked the same. So, he came back in 2022, so it was a few years ago now. But Beijing more or less looked the same, which is if you’d lived in China during the 2000s, the 2010s, if you went away for a while, you wouldn’t expect to come back to a Chinese city and for it to look the same.
I mean, just the sheer pace of construction constantly. I mean, there was a sense that if you stood still long enough, someone would build something on top of you. So, to kind of come back after a few years and the pace to look the same, in one sense, is quite significant. But although everything looks the same, it also kind of feels incredibly different. And the feel, it’s partly just the way people live their lives. I mean, everyone kind of talks ad nauseam about how everything’s done online, on people’s phones. Everything’s done in WeChat. All payments are done electronically.
I mean, it’s stuff like that. But it’s also just how people feel about their everyday lives at the moment. When we were there, in some ways, it kind of felt like the sheer fact that you were living and working in China, you felt like you were part of history, right? Everything was onwards and upwards. There was a real optimism about what was happening. There was a kind of brightness about the future. There was a degree of uncertainty about what the future would bring, but everything seemed to be moving in a certain direction where things could only get better.
And that’s not really the vibe there at all whatsoever, which is quite interesting because if you spend any time online in sort of Western countries, it’s all bright, shiny, sparkly China. I mean, it’s all the infrastructure porn. It’s all the tech innovation. I think a lot of people who do go on sort of investor trips or whatever to China, and that’s kind of what they see as well, particularly if you’re just sort of kicking around, even just as a tourist. But you get talking to people and that sort of unbridled optimism about the future that kind of used to exist doesn’t really seem to be there anymore.
And I think a layer of that optimism back then was like, things have been so great, they can only get better. But also, hey, the state really has this thing under control. And whenever there’s a dip, we always come out the other side. Whereas now, that doesn’t really seem to be there. There doesn’t seem to be that sort of underlying, “Oh, don’t worry, somebody’s in control of this and we’ll sort things out.” It’s more, you scratch the surface and everyone has a story about somebody who had their pay cut, right? Or if they’re not talking about income, they’re talking about property. People just having seen, particularly young people, I think people who acquired their property in the ‘90s or early 2000s, sort of boomers in particular, I mean, they’re sitting pretty because they’ve just seen the value of their homes absolutely explode.
But anybody of kind of our generation, either their property, the value of their home is underwater, or any of the gains in wealth that they saw have been massively eroded. So, between that sort of those income cuts and the property devaluation, there’s a sense of like, what’s going to happen to you? People are genuinely worse off than they used to be. And, of course, the other thing that’s really palpable as you’re kicking around is just how cheap stuff is. And I think that’s particularly obvious having come from the United States as well, where nothing particularly feels cheap anymore.
And so, in China, when you kind of pick things up at the shop and it’s like, “Oh, wow, this is fantastic.” But, you know, that’s kind of still part and parcel of the degree to which people have seen their wealth or their income eroded as well. So, the only real glimmer, and it comes up a fair bit, is the stock market, which did incredibly well in the third quarter. It kind of moved sideways in the fourth quarter. It’s sort of showing signs of life again. But some people did really well out of the stock market. People have got one eye on that.
Not everyone’s invested in it, so it’s not going to be a source of renewal of wealth for the vast majority of Chinese people. But that kind of just is lurking there. People are wary of it, but that’s kind of lurking there as one of those things of like, “Okay, maybe there could be a real opportunity here.” I think more than anything, It was just really experiencing quite palpably and personally something that we talk about a bunch, and that’s how really China is two economies at the moment.
It’s not a two-speed economy. It is two distinct economies. And the first is the one that we see from abroad and I think also what you kind of see on social media, which is all about not just the sheer sort of robustness of China’s export machine, but even the nature of what’s being exported and produced — the electric vehicles, the flying cars, the humanoid robots, that sort of stuff. And then there’s the other side, the other economy, which is the one being experienced by ordinary people in China. And that’s one where incomes aren’t what they used to be, where they’ve seen their wealth really take a hit, where prices aren’t rising. And, of course, I mean, I was only in Beijing, right?
Beijing is not representative of a whole country. And from what I understand, certainly in some small towns, places where communities were really badly off, the government has really made an effort to sort of support their incomes. Places like that, you know, there is a degree of optimism. People are a lot better off than they were five years ago. But I think what I was seeing in Beijing is pretty much the common story around all, let’s just go with most of China’s big cities.
Andrew: Yeah, I was actually going to make that point about Beijing. I had a few reactions to what you said, but one is exactly what you said. Beijing is not China, just in the same way that D.C. is not the U.S., or New York’s not the U.S., right? So, we have to take that sort of with a grain of salt. And I think a lot of the conversation in Beijing, because it’s the political capital, lends itself to policy and politics, especially when you do what we do for a living. And so in this moment, when people are talking about there’s going to be, I think, a lot of negativity in terms of policy isn’t doing what a lot of people hope it would be doing.
I remember an anecdote from when we were doing a briefing on the 19th Party Congress. We had been doing them in Beijing. So, this was the 19th Party Congress. That would have been, I don’t know, 2018, I think. And we did some briefings in Beijing. I went with a colleague up to Shenyang, capital of Shandong. And we met with the U.S. consulate at the time, who, I believe, was Sean Stein, the current president of USCBC, who’s been on the podcast before. I didn’t kind of connect to that he was that same guy until actually pretty recently.
But point is, everything politically is so in your face in Beijing. And I remember going on that trip. It was during or right after the 19th Party Congress. So, one of the most political moments in the calendar, in the five-year cycle. And I saw one billboard with Xi Jinping’s face on it and some political slogan on the way in from the airport, a couple of miles from the airport, and then never saw another one the whole time I was there. So, your experience and everything we’re saying is definitely colored by being in Beijing specifically. And I think we just want to acknowledge that.
And the second thing I’ve obviously said, we’re going to take your experience in Beijing, the anecdotes and try to draw macro conclusions.
Dinny: And extrapolate it to the greater Chinese experience.
Andrew: Exactly. We are not doing that. The art here is to take anecdotes that really sort of bring life to your analysis, the macro analysis that we do, and looking at the data and looking through the policies and the trends that we see and then kind of put a fine point on it. So, we’re not extrapolating, but we are using these anecdotes to try to bring a little bit of life or poignancy to trends that we’re already seeing. So, I just want to make sure that’s clear. And then finally, your point on prices. I have probably said this on the podcast before, but I say it to people all the time. Our colleagues in China, all the time, they move every year because their rents get cheaper if they move to a new place.
They’re hugely benefiting from the involution in the food delivery sector. You can get great food for crazy, crazy cheap because the companies are competing against each other. And that’s one side of deflation, which deflation is definitely a very insidious macroeconomic challenge. But from a consumer standpoint, as long as your wages aren’t decreasing, low or stable, or even slightly declining prices are not something that you hate. So, anyway, that was just another thing that I wanted to throw in, just some observations from everything you said. You said overall the mood’s pretty dour.
That’s like among Chinese, even more so among the Chinese individuals that I’ve interacted with over the past few years. And it’s a pretty consistent theme that I hear from people going in and out of China. But the question is, were there any sort of bright spots in the conversation you were having? Anything you’d point to that where people are hanging a little bit of hope on?
Dinny: Yeah, quite surprisingly, investment might be one. I know we did a whole podcast on this a couple of weeks ago about how weak investment was in the third quarter. It sort of contracted. It fell by 12% in October, 12% in November, 15%, almost 16% in December. Looking into the new year, it kind of looked like it was going to be more of the same. It’s because property investment has fallen so much. It was because infrastructure investment last year was shrunk, which is kind of unheard of, but it was less than 2024. And of course, on top of that was the anti-involution campaign that sort of efforts to rein in overcapacity had led to sort of a sudden freezing in investment in a lot of manufacturing facilities for a lot of industries. But there does seem to be an optimism that investment, certainly in some areas, could get a real boost because of exports.
So yeah, a lot of companies aren’t investing because of overcapacity, but some industries are operating at utilization levels that are well below their long-term averages. And export demand could drive investment this year. And I’m kind of stealing this thunder, but our colleague Joe has done a bunch of work on this, and he came up with three areas where this is pretty clear.
And the first is chemicals or specifically chemical fiber manufacturing. So industrial capacity utilization rates are at about 95%, 96%, which it’s higher than pre-pandemic levels, about three percentage point higher than pre-pandemic levels. And there’s been a real explosion in export orders. And so we’re kind of seeing instances so far of some firms in the space already having announced meaningful investment in new production facilities. We’re seeing it in electronic equipment manufacturing, and that’s sort of been supported by the sort of the surge in demand for the semiconductors. Again, same sort of thing, we’re seeing sort of big expansion of capacity by memory producers and in other chip makers in China. It’s all about expanding capacity. And then also with power generation equipment as well.
And what you kind of find, put aside the chemical fiber manufacturers, but when you’re kind of looking at you know electrical, the electric equipment manufacturers, the power generation manufacturers, that’s kind of tied into a couple of big global trends. And really at the heart here is AI because we’re getting massive global build out of, particularly in the United States, but in China as well, of data centers. And those data centers are massively power hungry. And so, they require additional power generation as well. At the same time, that’s not just the only thing driving this. I mean, Europe is going through its own power grid upgrades. China is sort of overhauling its own grid.
And so, there does seem to be some sort of underlying global trends that are supporting this. But I think a really interesting takeaway here is that, yes, we’ll potentially see meaningful investment in certain manufacturing industries in China this year, and that demand is primarily led by exports. And one of those big export themes is AI. So, as the world doubles down on investment in AI, China’s export machine has benefited directly from that. And also, I think the other thing that came up while I was in Beijing as well is that China stands to benefit from the global expansion of defense spending. Now, I think we’ve talked about before how certain economies around the world or developed economies with advanced manufacturing, they are increasingly finding their traditional markets and demand for their products being stripped away by Chinese firms having aggressively been able to move into the same space.
And so where does that leave advanced economies? Well, one of the things they can do is try and expand investment in industries in which they don’t have to compete with China. One of the very few areas where they can do that is defense. Now, of course, global defense spending is rising for a whole lot of reasons, and it might not be explicitly linked to industrial hollowing out or the industrial threat from China. But at the same time, we are seeing countries around the world spending more on defense, whether it be because the Trump administration is telling NATO to up their spending, whether it be because the Europeans are starting to invest because of their concerns about Russia, whether it be because of concerns about China itself. For whatever reason, countries are spending a lot more on defense. And China, Chinese manufacturers stand to benefit because Chinese firms play such an integral part of global supply chains, even for defense products.
So, yeah, that was kind of something that I found interesting because anyone who listened to our podcast from a couple of weeks ago, we were like, you know, the outlook for investment doesn’t look great. There are certain areas where Beijing is creating domestic demand, like State Grid has committed to a massive expansion in investment over the last five years. We had something in our dailies today about how Beijing wants to ensure 5G connectivity for the low-altitude economy. So, pretty much any drones or flying cars can be connected to Wi-Fi in China’s cities, whereas most Wi-Fi networks don’t sort of extend that high up.
So again, Beijing creating a new source of demand for infrastructure investment. So, we can kind of see Beijing doing that, creating new demand for investment. But then on top of this, this whole exports demand for Chinese manufacturers fueling exports further and supporting investment in certain industries that are already operating at the limits of the capacity, that wasn’t something that was on our radar. And it’s something that kind of came up for discussion while we were in Beijing. And when we came back, yeah, in some places, it certainly seems as though the numbers are bearing that out.
Andrew: I was just going to weigh in on a couple of things there, one of which I was going to say to your comments earlier, but you sparked the idea again, and that is the idea of average individuals not feeling the fruits of economic growth. You look at China news, a lot of the influencer stories, especially from Westerners who visit are like amazing manufacturing, build out robotics, all of this cool hot tech stuff. But individuals aren’t feeling it. So, I often look for parallels between sort of what’s happening in China’s economy and what’s happening in other economies, specifically the U.S. economy, just to try to sort of bring U.S. listeners at least bring it home a little bit more.
And obviously the economies are not in exactly the same place. China’s dealing with deflation. The U.S. has somewhat of inflationary pressure, not terrible as it was a few years ago. So, there’s no difference. But the idea that you kind of have this K-shaped economy where it’s very heavy, top heavy, and driven by massive bets and investments on innovation and specifically AI, right? So, that’s powering the economy ahead in the U.S. And yet you have a lot of people who are discontent with quality of life, with cost of living, the affordability crisis that people talk about. And it’s kind of the same in China, right? You’ve got huge bets, huge investments on manufacturing, on AI, on technological innovation, industrial innovation.
And yet it’s not sort of trickling down or it’s not being felt in people’s individual lives. I think that’s a challenge for both countries, right? In the U.S., it’s likely to manifest, or people are thinking it may manifest in the defeat of Republicans at the mid-term elections in 2026. What year are we in? In a few months. In China, it’ll be interesting to see how that discontent registers over time, right? How the party responds, how people’s frustrations are vented, and what kind of new realities it leads to. You talked about people recently keeping an eye on the stock market. I mean, that’s something that, you know, the Chinese government wants. It wants people to move away from property as a store of household wealth to the stock market.
So, as more and more people get invested in the stock market, maybe that starts to boost the wealth effect and offset some of the more negative aspects of what people are feeling. But anyway, that was just one observation. And the other observation was, I was just thinking, so you’re saying basically that global investment in AI and defense is driving global economy and propping up exports of industrial goods and manufactured goods from China. I feel like that could be the opening sentence in a book about the end of the world.
Dinny: Yeah, no, that’s not… I think I’ve read this book before. Yeah, that’s… when you put it like that.
Andrew: Yeah, so I just had to point that out because you were like, yeah, AI is doing great. Defense is doing great. I mean, those are what we have to hang our hat on globally. And there is an argument that it’s only going to boost demand for Chinese industrial products. I don’t know. I don’t know what the outcome, the long-term outcome of that is. But it’s something we’ll keep an eye on. I want to pivot, though, to the consumption side of things, unless was there something else you wanted to talk to on exports or?
Dinny: No, no, it pretty much covers it.
Andrew: So, we often focus on investment and consumption because the national income accounts are government spending, investment, consumption, and exports. Those are the big chunks of the economy for people who aren’t economists. That’s why we focus on them regularly. So, we’ve talked about the investment piece. What about consumption? What was the kind of narrative you were hearing, and how does that tie to kind of what we’re already thinking about consumption in China?
Dinny: Yeah, I think what really became clear to me, I mean, we’ve been talking for months now, even longer, that Beijing isn’t really doing anything in a meaningful sense to spark consumption, right? That would require significant wealth redistribution. There’s a bunch of reasons why they’re not doing it. I guess I hadn’t fully thought through what the implications of that were. And that realistically, any sort of pro-consumption policies that Beijing is likely to roll out this year, they’re not going to move the needle in a meaningful way. In fact, the only thing that is going to unleash the spending capacity of Chinese households is a recovery of the housing market.
That the market bottoms out, prices start rising, and people start buying homes again. Because housing is that kind of weird sort of thing where it’s both an investment and it’s a consumer good. Because when you buy a home, you’re investing in it. This is something that you’re holding for the long term and you’re hoping that the value will go up over time. But at the same time, it is also a purchase of steel, cement, pipes, wiring, lights, laminate floors, kitchen cabinets. I mean, the whole thing. You’re actually purchasing a whole lot of physical stuff. And so, if we think about housing for a moment, not as an investment good, but as a consumption good, that is the recovery of housing, or at least at the bare minimum, a bottoming out of the housing market.
It’s the only real thing that is going to get people consuming again, because it’s the only sort of thing which is big enough and for which there is such large scale demand. I mean, it’s the sort of thing that everybody needs somewhere to live. That if and when prices start rising and people start buying homes again, that is enough of a change in consumption habits or consumption trajectory to have a meaningful impact on the economy. And until that happens, then I don’t think we really can expect much of consumption at all. I mean, yeah, interesting story is consumer services. I think it’s a fascinating space, it’s growing a lot more stronger than people’s purchasing of like physical retail goods. Let’s keep an eye on it. Let’s see what Beijing does about it. It’s clearly a priority.
You’re trying to cultivate a whole lot of new service sectors, etc., but it’s not a game-changer. The only thing that really matters for the economy at a macro level is people to get back buying apartments. So yeah, I mean, that’s the thing to watch for. I mean, we kind of see what happened in the fourth quarter. Property investment declined 17% in 2025. In December, it dropped 35% month on month, which I think I’ve said before, is absolutely mind-blowing. Five years into a property crisis, and you’re still getting that kind of decline? It’s incredible. But the upside of having declines that sharp is it kind of makes you think, surely, surely it doesn’t have that much further to fall, right? I mean, I think, what, housing investment levels are now at 2013 levels? I mean, surely the bottom is within sight.
I don’t think it’s going to happen in the next six months. It might start to happen in the major cities in the next 12 months. But yeah, only once it happens, will I think consumers start making a meaningful contribution to the economy again, and expanding and growing. Of course, they already make a meaningful contribution, but in terms of an expanding contribution.
Andrew: Yeah, it’s a great point. And I think a couple of things. One is, like you said, once the property sector bottoms out, you’ll get growth off of a newer base. And it doesn’t matter if the base is lower. What matters is the growth rate from there on out.
Dinny: And it’s not even growth. If it just stops contracting.
Andrew: Yes, totally.
Dinny: I mean, the sheer fact of its contraction means that every month it is dragging the pace of economic activity lower than it otherwise would be. If it just stops contracting, the economic conditions will improve. And then, lo and behold, even if it just starts expanding a little bit, well, I mean, that would just be rainbows and unicorns.
Andrew: Well, I mean, almost by definition, you know, mathematically, at some point that will happen. Like you say, the stabilization has to happen first, and then an increase in year-on-year growth will happen because you can only contract so far until that contraction stops. So, that is going to happen at some point. And we’ve said this time after time. I think people are trying to make definitive projections and pronouncements about what China’s economy is going to look like in terms of pure economic growth rates two, three, five, 10 years out right now. It’s just like, it’s a fool’s errand because the property market’s such a wild card. We need to wrap up here soon, but I mean, this is something I think we’ve been guilty of, frankly, right? Is sort of being like, will they do a little bit more on consumption? Will they do a little bit more of consumption? Can consumption get up?
I mean, basically what you’re saying is you’re sort of just admitting or facing reality, like no tinkering around the edges on consumption or even a more aggressive consumer subsidy type policy is going to be able to offset this property market thing. And let’s just finally realize that now that we’re five years in, maybe we’re a little bit late, but we’re recognizing it. And then, so one question mark, is that what you’re saying? Two, you seem to indicate that this was sort of hit home by some of the conversations you had when you were on the ground there. Is that right? That seems to be the sense among people who actually own homes in China.
Dinny: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah, it was kind of just being faced with the reality of people dealing with pay cuts, people dealing with declining prices, with the erosion of wealth, with all of that. Beijing isn’t looking at doing anything on the scale that is going to materially change their consumption habits. Even a recovery in the stock market would be great, a sort of higher stock prices, greater wealth effects. But even then, that only affects what, 10% of the population that have got money and shares? Whereas the degree of home ownership in China is almost universal.
And so, everybody, to some degree, has been affected by the decline of their homes. And that’s kind of had ripple effects throughout the economy, not just prices, but also the decline of investment. And so, yeah, the only thing that is going to get people to really dip into those precautionary emergency savings, as they’ve been labeled, is for housing prices to start rising again. I think it just kind of came home to me. I sort of felt it viscerally when I was in Beijing.
Andrew: Well, Dinny, I think we can leave it there for today. Thanks for walking us through your sort of insights and tying the on-the-ground experience to sort of the macro themes that we obviously are continually investigating. I’m glad you had a great trip. For me, Beijing feels like a little bit like home. I spent all of my 30s there. Like, I grew up professionally there. And so going back always feels a little bit like going home in a way. And so, I’m excited to get back here in a few weeks. Just quickly for the listeners, obviously, this podcast was a little bit shorter than we’ve been doing recently. We wanted to keep this one tight. Next week, we’re going to be off for Chinese New Year. Then we’ll be off to the races and on the gala for the Year of the Horse. And we’ll have some few changes.
Dinny: Did you prepare that one in advance, or was that just off the cuff?
Andrew: No, that was on the fly.
Dinny: That was good, dude. That was good. God, you should write this stuff down.
Andrew: But then we’ll have some changes to the pod, I think some positive changes. We’ll still have plenty of Trivium content. Dinny will be on regularly, Trivium in-house people. But we’ll also be bringing on more external people with some sort of broader discussions on various China themes. So, we’re excited about that. Be on the lookout for that after China’s New Year, when we take a break next week. But Dinny, thanks again, man. Great to see you as always. Excellent insights as always.
Dinny: Thanks, mate. All right, until next time.
Andrew: Yeah, and thanks everybody for listening. We’ll see you next time. Bye, everybody
